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LECTURES   ON 
CAVALRY 


BY 


CAPTAIN  P.  T.  HAYNE,  jr. 

12th  Cavalry, 

Instructor 

Department  of  Military  Art 

The  Army  Service  Schools 


PRESS  OF  THE    ARMY   SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


1915 


LECTURES   ON 
CAVALRY 


BY 


CAPTAIN  P.  T.  HAYNE,  jr., 

12  th  Cavalry, 

Instructor 

Department  of  Military  Art 

The  Army  Service  Schools 


PRESS  OF  THE    ARMY   SERVICE  SCHOOLS 

1915 


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First     Lecture 


HAVE  two  lectures  and  one  conference  in  which 
-*-  to  discuss  the  employment  or  use  of  cavalry. 
There  is  a  good  deal  on  this  subject  scattered  through 
the  F.S.R.,  and  certain  paragraphs  of  the  C.D.R. 
have  been  assigned  for  conference.  But  what  is 
given  in  both  F.S.R.,  and  C.D.R.  is  in  general  so 
condensed  that  it  does  not  clear  up  the  situation  much 
unless  one  has  a  good  mental  picture  of  the  situations 
the  authors  had  in  view.  I  shall  try  to  go  more  into 
detail,  so  that  the  application  of  the  principles  given 
in  the  C.D.R.  and  the  F.S.R.  may  be  more  clear. 

The  whole  matter  of  the  employment  of  cavalry 
is  so  little  a  matter  of  rule  that  it  may  be  said  there 
are  no  rules  for  it.  In  regard  to  some  questions  there 
are  various  opinions,  and  the  details  of  how  cavalry 
was  handled  in  war  to  accomplish  certain  results  are 
hard  to  obtain.  But  there  are  a  number  of  general 
principles  as  to  which  there  is  very  little  question, 
though  the  methods  of  applying  these  principles  may 
vary. 

More  new  ideas  on  the  subject  of  the  employment 
of  cavalry  were  brought  out  and  put  into  practice 
in  our  Civil  War  than  in  any  war  since,  and,  up  to 
the  present  time,  there  is  no  better  source  of  infor- 
mation as  to  how  cavalry  should  be  handled— also, 
from  this  same  war  numerous  examples  of  how  cav- 
alry should  never  be  used. 

As  reconnaissance,  or  the  getting  of  information, 
is  the  most  important  mission  of  cavalry  at  the  begin- 
ning of  a  campaign,  I  shall  first  take  up  reconnais- 


339507 


sance,  and  spend  a  good  deal  of  time  on  it.  Then 
discuss  more  briefly  some  of  the  other  uses  of  cavalry, 
and  finally  will  come  to  the  cavalry  combat. 

If  any  one  has  any  questions  I  will  be  glad  to 
have  them  asked  at  any  time  during  the  lectures  or 
afterwards. 

As  you  all  know  a  board  of  cavalry  officers  worked 
for  some  time  on  a  new  system  of  cavalry  drill,  to 
replace  that  which  we  have  used  for  many  years. 
The  system  devised  by  this  board  has  finally  been 
published  as  "Cavalry  Service  Regulations/ '  but 
these  Regulations  are  ' 'experimental,' '  and  on  June 
1,  1915,  every  cavalry  officer  is  to  submit  a  report  on 
these  Regulations,  with  recommendations  as  to 
changes. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  school  year  the  "Cavalry 
Service  Regulations"  had  not  been  published,  and 
the  Tables  of  Organization  published  with  the  latest 
F.S.R.  give  the  organization  of  the  old  Drill  Regula- 
tions, not  of  the  new  Service  Regulations.  It  was 
therefore  decided  by  the  Military  Art  Department  to 
use  throughout  this  year  the  cavalry  organization 
given  in  the  Tables  of  Organization  and  the  old  Cav- 
alry Drill  Regulations  based  on  this  organization. 

It  is  prescribed  that  one  or  more  brigades  or  di- 
visions of  cavalry  will  form  part  of  a  field  army, 
and  that  two  or  more  cavalry  divisions  may  be  com- 
bined under  one  leader.  The  division,  as  with  the 
infantry,  is  the  smallest  unit  that  has  artillery  and 
technical  troops  permanently  assigned,  but  it  is  ex- 
pected that  cavalry  brigades  will  often  operate  de- 
tached, in  which  case  one  or  more  batteries  of  horse 
artillery  will  be  attached  if  available,  and  such  other 
troops  and  trains  as  may  be  needed. 

At  the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  when  the 
armies  are  still  distant,  the  first  mission  that  is  usu- 


— 5— 

ally  assigned  to  the  cavalry  division  is  to  get  infor- 
mation, a  mission  of  reconnaissance. 

TheF.S.R.  (par.  125)  say:  "The  cavalry  divi- 
sion is  pushed  as  independent  cavalry  far  to  the  front, 
often  several  days'  march  in  advance  of  the  remain- 
der of  the  field  army,  to  drive  back  the  covering 
forces  of  the  enemy  and  to  gain  information  of  his 
dispositions,  strength  and  movements.  This  is  the 
most  valuable  use  of  the  cavalry  division  in  the  open- 
ing stages  of  a  campaign/ ' 

The  employment  of  these  cavalry  brigade  divi- 
sions as  independent  cavalry,  reconnoitering  far 
ahead  of  the  remainder  of  the  field  army  is  sometimes 
called  the  strategic  employment  of  cavalry,  because 
the  strategic  dispositions  made  by  the  army  com- 
mander will  be  based  on  information  obtained  by  this 
independent  cavalry. 

General  Von  Bernhardi  ("Cavalry  in  Future 
Wars,"  p.  104)  objects  to  all  attempts  to  prescribe 
anything  in  regulations  as  to  the  strategic  employ- 
ment of  cavalry.  He  says:  — "I  hold  all  these  at- 
tempts, which  only  hamper  the  free  strategic  employ- 
ment of  cavalry,  as  not  only  mistaken,  but  contrary 
to  the  very  essence  of  our  being." 

There  is  nothing  in  our  F.S.R.  nor  in  our  C.D.R. 
to  hamper  the  free  strategic  employment  of  cavalry, 
but  both  agree  as  to  the  advisability  of  holding  as 
much  of  the  cavalry  as  possible  in  a  strong  central 
mass,  and  defeating  the  enemy's  cavalry  by  the  use 
of  this  mass.  The  reason  for  this  plan  is  plain.  What 
the  commander  who  sends  out  the  cavalry  wants  is 
information  as  to  the  enemy's  main  body,  his  infan- 
try and  artillery.  But  before  finding  this  main  body 
our  cavalry  will  first  strike  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
if  reconnaissance  is  to  be  successful,  and  get  this  in- 
formation as  to  the  troops  in  rear,  the  hostile  cavalry 
must  be  defeated. 


— 6— 

The  German  F.S.R.  (par.  118)  say:  "It  is  of 
great  importance  to  drive  the  enemy's  cavalry  out  of 
the  field  as  early  as  possible,  and  to  obtain  a  decisive 
moral  superiority  over  them.  All  bodies  of  cavalry, 
even  patrols,  should  therefore  lose  no  opportunity  of 
attacking  the  enemy's  horsemen  whenever  they  show 
themselves,  provided  that  circumstances  and  their 
own  duties  allow  of  this.  This  will  expedite  the  pro- 
cess of  reconnaissance,  and  will  enable  it  to  be  carried 
out  with  the  certainty  of  success  for  the  remainder  of 
the  campaign,  and  will,  moreover,  much  facilitate  the 
the  service  of  protection.' ' 

This  is  excellent  advice,  but  it  does  not  mean 
that  the  cavalry  commander  should  neglect  his  mis- 
sion of  getting  information  in  an  attempt  to  go  after 
and  defeat  the  hostile  cavalry.  This  hostile  cavalry 
is  only  of  importance  when  it  interferes  with  the  get- 
ting of  information;  if  it  keeps  out  of  the  way  the 
cavalry  commander  is  justified  in  ignoring  it  and 
carrying  out  his  mission  of  getting  information.  What 
the  cavalry  commander  should  do  is  to  bear  in  mind 
that  in  carrying  out  his  mission  of  reconnaissance  a 
fight  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  bound  to  come,  un- 
less the  enemy's  cavalry  is  very  weak  or  inefficient. 
He  should,  therefore,  be  prepared  at  all  times  for  this 
cavalry  fight,  and  should  endeavor  to  eliminate  the 
hostile  cavalry  as  early  in  the  game  as  practicable, 
thereby  facilitating  all  further  reconnaissance.  In 
order  to  be  prepared  for  this  cavalry  combat  the  in- 
dependent cavalry  is  kept  concentrated  as  much  as 
possible,  '  'as  a  mass  to  engage  and  defeat  the  enemy's 
cavalry."  In  the  meantime,  however,  the  getting 
of  information  does  not  wait  for  this  cavalry  fight, 
but  is  instead  the  primary  mission  of  the  cavalry,  the 
cavalry  fight  being  the  only  means  for  accomplishing 
this  mission,  not  an  end. 

To  show  that  making  the  cavalry  fight  secondary 


— 7— 

to  the  mission  of  getting  information  was  considered 
necessary  in  the  Civil  War,  I  will  read  an  order  from 
Meade  to  Pleasanton,  commanding  the  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  in 
which  he  emphasizes  this  point  as  if  the  cavalry  had 
at  times  devoted  too  much  attention  to  trying  to  de- 
feat the  hostile  cavalry. 

'  'Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 

June  30,  1863. 
Commanding  Officer,  Cavalry  Corps: 

The  Major  General  Commanding  directs  me  to 
say  that  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  him  that  he 
receive  reliable  information  of  the  presence  of  the 
enemy,  his  forces  and  his  movements.  His  projected 
movement  is  toward  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and 
Harrisburg  road.  His  instructions  require  him  to 
cover  Baltimore  and  Washington,  while  his  objective 
point  is  the  army  under  Lee.  To  be  able  to  find  if 
the  army  is  divided,  and  to  concentrate  upon  any  de- 
tached portion  of  it,  without  departing  from  the  in- 
structions which  govern  him,  would  be  a  great  object. 
People  in  the  country  are  so  frightened  that  he  must 
depend  solely  upon  the  cavalry  for  all  the  information 
he  can  gain.  He  looks  to  you  to  keep  him  informed 
of  their  movements,  and  especially  that  no  force  con- 
centrates on  his  right,  in  the  vicinity  of  York,  to  get 
between  him  and  the  Susquehanna,  and  also  that  no 
force  moves  on  his  left  toward  Hagerstown  and  the 
passes  below  Cashtown.  Your  cavalry  is  large  and 
must  be  vigilant  and  active.  The  reports  must  be 
those  gained  by  the  cavalry  themselves,  and  informa- 
tion sent  in  should  be  reliable. 

The  duty  you  have  to  perform  is  of  a  most  im- 
portant and  sacred  character.      Cavalry  battles  must 
be  secondary  to  this  object.     ******** 
Very  respectfully, 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
(R.  R.  45,  page  421.)  Asst.  Adjt.  Genl. 

This  letter  gives  the  cavalry  Commander  full  in- 
formation as  to  the  plans  of  the  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  gives  the  cavalry  the  mission 


— 8— 

of  getting  information,  states  what  information  is  of 
most  importance  but  leaves  to  the  cavalry  commander 
entire  freedom  as  to  methods  employed  to  accomplish 
his  mission— the  only  restriction  being  that  he  is  to 
make  the  getting  of  information  his  mission,  not  the 
defeat  of  the  hostile  cavalry. 

At  this  early  stage  of  the  campaign,  when  the 
enemy's  cavalry  is  still  undefeated,  the  advantage  of 
using  strategic  patrols  is  apparent,  and  the  distinc- 
tion between  strategic  and  tactical  patrols  is  plain. 

The  cavalry  commander  has  two  distinct  missions 
for  his  patrols.  One  is  to  get  the  information  as  to 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy  that  the  army  comman- 
der wants  in  order  to  make  his  strategic  dispositions. 
The  other  is  to  get  the  information  as  to  the  hostile 
cavalry  that  the  cavalry  commander  needs  in  order  to 
make  his  own  tactical  dispositions  to  defeat  this  cav- 
alry if  it  interferes  with  the  getting  of  information. 
The  cavalry  commander  can  not  wait  until  after  he 
has  met  and  defeated  the  hostile  cavalry  before  send- 
ing out  information  as  to  the  main  army  in  rear.  So 
he  employs  the  so-called  strategic  patrols,  which 
avoid  the  hostile  cavalry,  avoid  fighting,  and  by  cun- 
ning and  stealth  try  to  reach  the  enemy's  main  army 
in  rear  and  send  back  information  as  to  it.  At  the 
same  time  tactical  reconnoitering  patrols  get  in  con- 
tact with  the  hostile  cavalry  and  keep  the  cavalry 
commander  informed  as  to  its  movements. 

When  the  meeting  of  the  cavalry  forces  takes 
place,  if  our  cavalry  should  be  defeated  there  is  small 
chance  that  the  information  gained  by  the  strategic 
patrols  will  get  back  to  the  army  commander,  but  if 
we  succeed  in  driving  off  the  hostile  cavalry  valuable 
time  has  been  gained  in  starting  this  strategic  recon- 
naissance and  it  will  be  quite  possible  to  send  in  the 
information  gained. 


— 9— 

As  I  mentioned  once  before,  aeroplanes  should  be 
of  great  value  in  getting  the  information  that  these 
strategic  patrols  are  trying  to  get.  And  aeroplanes 
have  the  great  advantage  that  their  success  is  not  de- 
pendent on  driving  off  the  hostile  cavalry,  for  the  in- 
formation they  gain  can  be  brought  back  with  small 
chance  of  interference. 

The  tactical  reconnoitering  patrols,  sent  out  to 
get  information  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  have  recon- 
naissance as  their  principal  mission,  and  are  not  es- 
pecially charged  with  the  duty  of  attacking  and  driv- 
ing back  hostile  patrols  as  seems  to  be  contemplated 
by  the  German  F.S.R. ;  but  they  are  not  bound  to 
avoid  fighting  on  every  occasion  as  are  strategic  pa- 
trols. There  will  be  occasions  when  the  circumstan- 
ces and  their  mission  will  make  it  advisable  for  them 
to  attack  and  drive  back  hostile  patrols.  This  mission 
of  driving  back  hostile  patrols  will,  however,  be  es- 
pecially assigned  to  the  security  patrols,  such  as  the 
point  and  flank  patrols  of  the  advance  guard.  As 
far  as  their  strength  will  allow  these  security  patrols 
prevent  hostile  reconnaissance,  and  by  beating  and 
driving  back  hostile  patrols  whenever  practicable,  our 
patrols  will  not  only  make  reconnaissance  difficult  for 
the  enemy,  but  will  also  aid  in  establishing  a  superior 
morale  for  our  cavalry,  even  before  the  cavalry  masses 
meet  and  test  their  strength. 

I  will  now  leave  the  cavalry  brigades  or  division 
of  the  field  army  for  awhile  and  take  up  the  divisional 
cavalry. 

A  regiment  of  cavalry,  as  you  know,  forms  part 
of  an  infantry  division.  If  this  regiment  could  be 
kept  intact  when  it  is  to  reconnoiter  ahead  of  the  di- 
vision it  would  be  a  great  advantage,  but  however 
advantageous  this  might  be  it  will  seldom  be  possi- 
ble. Under  ordinary  circumstances  one  troop  is  de- 
tached as  part  of  the  military  police  and  train  guard, 


—10— 

under  the  commander  of  trains,  and  it  will  usually 
be  necessary  to  detach  some  troopers  to  do  the  local 
reconnaissance  that  the  I.D.R.  contemplate  having 
infantry  mounted  scouts  do.  All  such  detachments 
from  the  cavalry  should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
but  some  will  nearly  always  be  necessary. 

When  a  division  is  serving  as  part  of  a  field  army 
and  is  operating  in  rear  of  the  independent  cavalry 
of  the  army,  the  divisional  cavalry  ordinarily  forms 
part  of  an  advance  or  flank  guard,  and  maintains  con- 
nection with  the  independent  cavalry,  in  addition  to 
performing  such  reconnaissance  as  the  situation  de- 
mands. But  even  when  independent  brigades  and 
divisions  of  the  army  are  in  front,  the  divisional  cav- 
alry may  operate  under  the  direct  orders  of  the  di- 
vision commander  instead  of  being  attached  to  a 
covering  detachment. 

A  division  is,  however,  often  more  or  less  sepa- 
rated from  the  rest  of  its  field  army,  and  is  not  oper- 
ating in  rear  of  the  independent  cavalry  of  the  army. 
In  this  case  the  divisional  cavalry  performs  for  the 
division  what  the  independent  cavalry  of  the  army 
does  for  the  army,  and  generally  operates  under  the 
direct  orders  of  the  division  commander  as  independ- 
ent cavalry.  Most  of  the  division  problems  that  you 
will  have  here  deal  with  a  division  that  is  not  covered 
by  the  army  cavalry,  and  it  is  therefore  the  use  of 
the  cavalry  regiment  as  independent  cavalry  that  you 
will  have  in  division  problems. 

Let  us  now  take  the  case  of  an  infantry  division 
that  is  operating  somewhat  detached  from  other 
troops,  so  that  it  is  not  in  rear  of  the  cavalry  brigade 
or  division  of  the  army.  The  division  commander 
makes  the  cavalry  regiment  independent,  and  gives 
it  the  mission  of  getting  information  of  a  hostile  force 
whose  approximate  location  is  known,  but  of  which 
much    more   detailed  information   is   desired.     The 


—11— 

handling  of  the  cavalry  regiment  in  this  situation  is 
so  similar  to  the  handling  of  the  independent  cavalry- 
brigades  or  division  of  a  field  army  that  to  under- 
stand one  will  give  a  very  good  idea  of  the  other. 

Of  course  no  two  situations  would  be  handled  in 
exactly  the  same  way,  and  the  method  I  shall  try  to 
outline  is  only  one  way  of  accomplishing  this  mission 
of  reconnaissance,  not  a  plan  that  is  expected  to  be 
applicable  on  all  occasions.  But  I  think  it  may  help 
to  give  in  a  general  way  what  the  regimental  com- 
mander might  do  in  this  situation,  to  accomplish  his 
mission  of  getting  information. 

In  the  first  place  the  colonel  would  probably  send 
one  or  two  strategic  patrols  to  the  vicinity  where  it 
is  thought  the  enemy's  main  force  is.  These  patrols 
would  necessarily  be  officers'  patrols,  and  they  would 
have  to  be  of  sufficient  strength  to  send  back  one  or 
two  messages,  and  each  of  these  messages  will  take 
at  least  two  men.  General  Von  Bernhardi  says  ('  'Cav- 
alry in  Future  Wars,*'  page  136)  that  an  officer  and 
eight  men  is  the  proper  strength  for  such  patrols  in 
most  cases.  This  allows  the  patrol  leader  to  send 
back  two  messages,  each  being  carried  by  a  small 
patrol  of  three  men.  The  message  is  sent  by  three 
men  because  it  will  usually  have  to  pass  through  a 
district  controlled  by  the  enemy. 

General  Von  Alten  makes  such  strategic  patrols 
an  officer  and  ten  men  (Studies  in  Ap.  Tactics),  so 
these  two  authorities  agree  pretty  closely  as  to  the 
strength  of  such  a  strategic  patrol.  These  two 
authors,  however,  disagree  as  to  the  importance  of 
such  strategic  patrols.  Bernhardi  thinks  them  indis- 
pensable, and  thinks  they  will  often  get  valuable  infor- 
mation and  succeed  in  getting  it  back.  Von  Alten 
thinks  they  will  fail  to  get  information,  or  else  will 
fail  to  get  it  back  safely  in  most  cases,  nevertheless  he 
sends  them  out  in  hopes  they  will  be  successful. 


—12— 

The  use  of  aeroplanes  will  certainly  make  them 
less  necessary,  but  they  will  still  be  valuable  in  many 
cases  I  think. 

This  is  all  the  colonel  can  do  at  this  time  toward 
starting  strategic  reconnaissance,  but  some  system 
of  tactical  reconnoitering  patrols  is  required,  to  keep 
him  informed  of  any  troops  close  enough  to  affect 
tactical  dispositions.  In  order  to  accomplish  their 
purpose  these  patrols  must  be  numerous,  and  if  the 
colonel  sends  them  out  himself,  and  has  them  report 
direct  to  him,  he  will  have  a  lot  of  detail  to  look  out 
for,  and  will  find  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  keep 
in  touch  with  so  many  patrols  and  back  up  promptly 
those  that  need  assistance. 

This  difficulty  can  be  avoided  by  sending  out  in- 
stead, one  or  more  reconnoitering  or  contact  troops, 
giving  the  troop  commander  instructions  as  to  the 
patrolling  that  is  desired  and  the  direction  of  march 
of  the  regiment,  and  leaving  to  his  judgment  the 
details  of  handling  these  reconnoitering  patrols. 
This  reconnoitering  troop  starts  out  an  hour  or  two 
ahead  of  the  rest  of  the  regiment,  sends  out  such  re- 
connoitering troops  as  are  necessary,  and  provides  for 
its  own  security  by  having  an  advance  party  in  front, 
and  such  other  security  patrols  as  are  neeeded. 

The  patrols  sent  out  from  this  contact  troop  must 
have  very  clearly  in  mind  the  difference  between  re- 
connoitering patrols  and  security  patrols,  and  each 
must  know  whether  its  mission  is  reconnaissance  or 
security.  Reconnoitering  patrols  regulate  their  move- 
ments on  those  of  the  enemy  and  do  not  change  their 
routes  necessarily  because  the  troop  changes  its  route. 
Security  patrols  on  the  contrary,  such  as  the  point 
and  patrols  sent  out  to  cover  a  flank,  must  remain  in 
constant  touch  with  the  troop  and  regulate  their 
movements  entirely  on  it.  If  they  were  to  attempt 
to  follow  up  the  enemy  they  would  lose  connection 


—13— 

with  the  troop  and  might  leave  it  unprotected  from 
the  direction  that  they  were  specially  depended  upon 
to  cover. 

Our  troop  has  only  three  officers  and  86  men  as  its 
maximum  strength.  Hence  if  it  is  much  reduced,  as 
it  certainly  will  be  very  soon  after  the  beginning  of  a 
campaign,  a  squadron  would  be  used  instead  as  the 
body  to  send  out  the  reconnoitering  patrols.  That  is 
why  par.  860,  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations,  speaks  of 
contact  squadrons  rather  than  contact  troops.  When 
the  troop  is  at  its  maximum  strength,  however,  as  it 
is  assumed  to  be  in  most  problems,  the  troop  is  usual- 
ly more  nearly  the  strength  required  for  this  duty  of 
reconnaissance  than  a  squadron.  It  may  be  advisable 
at  times  to  attach  additional  officers'  patrols  to  a  con- 
tact troop.  If  patrols  are  already  out  in  the  direction 
in  which  the  troop  is  to  reconnoiter,  these  would  ordi- 
narily be  put  under  the  orders  of  the  troop  comman- 
der although  from  some  other  troop,  thus  giving  the 
slight  additional  strength  required. 

To  keep  as  much  of  the  cavalry  as  possible  con- 
centrated in  a  "central  mass"  is  a  cardinal  principle, 
hence  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  send  out  a  squadron  on 
this  duty,  if  a  troop  with  a  few  additional  patrols  at- 
tached could  efficiently  perform  the  duty.  For  a  reg- 
iment to  send  out  a  whole  war  strength  squadron  as 
a  contact  squadron  would  be  exceptional,  though  a 
brigade  or  division  on  reconnaissance  duty  might 
often  send  out  a  contact  squadron  of  the  reduced 
strength  that  most  squadrons  would  have. 

The  commander  of  this  reconnoitering  troop 
makes  no  effort  to  keep  any  prescribed  distance  from 
the  regiment.  From  time  to  time  he  sends  in  mes- 
sages to  the  regiment,  whether  anything  of  impor- 
tance has  occurred  or  not,  and  keeps  the  regimental 
commander  informed  as  to  the  movements  of  the 
troop  and  of  the  patrols  sent  out.     The  messengers 


—14— 

sent  in  also  serves  to  keep  the  troop  commander  in- 
formed of  the  movements  of  the  regiment,  though 
any  considerable  change  of  plans  in  regard  to  the 
movements  of  the  regiment  would  be  reported  to  him 
at  once,  by  messengers  sent  from  the  regiment.  The 
commander  of  this  reconnoitering  troop  can  keep  in 
touch  with  his  reconnoitering  patrols  much  more 
easily  than  the  regimental  commander  could,  and  he 
can  also  back  up  promptly  a  patrol  that  he  thinks 
needs  assistance. 

The  reconnoitering  troop  does  not  necessarily 
march  on  the  road  that  it  starts  out  on  nor  keep  up 
a  continuous  march.  As  far  as  practicable  its  march 
for  an  hour  or  two  ahead  is  determined  upon,  then  it 
may  await  reports  of  patrols,  and  based  on  these  re- 
ports the  troop  commander  will  determine  what  the 
further  conduct  of  the  troop  should  be.  When 
moving  it  can  move  rapidly,  and  take  advantage  of 
halts  to  rest  and  feed  and  water  the  horses.  When 
leaving  a  place  beyond  which  the  march  of  the  troop 
has  not  been  previously  decided  upon,  if  there  are 
patrols  out  that  have  not  been  informed  as  to  the  fu- 
ture movements  of  the  troop,  either  a  connecting  pa- 
trol must  be  left  or  all  patrols  notified  of  the  next 
place  to  which  the  troop  will  march. 

It  will  not  generally  be  practicable  for  contact 
troops  to  keep  up  communications  with  neighboring 
contact  troops,  and  orders  given  them  should  not  re- 
quire this.  To  reconnoiter  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy  and  keep  in  communication  with  the  regiment, 
will  give  the  troop  commander  all  he  can  do.  The 
regimental  commander,  being  informed  of  the  move- 
ments of  all  contact  troops,  and  in  a  general  way 
of  their  patrols,  can  fill  gaps  that  may  occur,  or  take 
such  other  steps  as  may  be  necessary. 

If  the  contact  troop  is  operating  in  friendly  ter- 
ritory its  work  is  very  much  simplified.     Information 


—-15— 

of  the  enemy  is  more  readily  obtained  from  the  inhab- 
itants, patrols  may  be  made  smaller,  and  messengers 
get  through  more  easily. 

The  commander  of  a  reconnoitering  troop  must 
have  a  clear  idea  of  the  general  situation,  for  he  will 
be  thrown  on  his  own  resources  a  great  deal,  and  must 
also  be  able  to  determine  whether  the  messages  sent 
in  by  his  patrol  are  important  or  not.  He  is  expected 
to  be  a  kind  of  clearing  house  for  messages  from  pa- 
trols, sends  in  at  once  those  of  special  importance,  and 
embodies  the  information  contained  in  the  others  in  his 
own  messages,  sent  in  from  time  to  time.  It  may 
happen  too  that  a  message  is  of  such  importance  that 
it  should  be  sent  direct  to  the  division  commander, 
instead  of  to  the  cavalry  commander,  in  order  to  save 
time;  only  by  having  a  clear  idea  of  the  situation  can 
the  commander  of  the  contact  troop  use  good  judg- 
ment in  settling  these  questions. 

The  distance  traveled  by  the  patrols  of  a  contact 
troop  will  necessarily  be  very  much  greater  than 
that  traveled  by  the  troop  itself.  And  the  troop  will 
often  be  required  to  remain  out  several  days.  There- 
fore the  marches  made  by  the  main  body  of  the  troop 
should  not  be  great,  Von  Bernhardi  gives  25  miles  as 
quite  sufficient  ("Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace,' '  p.  37). 

The  amount  of  front  that  a  contact  troop  can 
cover  depends  so  much  on  the  number  of  roads,  the 
character  of  the  country,  and  the  information  already 
vn  hand  as  to  the  enemy,  that  no  rule  would  help. 
The  German  F.S.R.  give  ten  to  fourteen  miles  as  the 
maximum  for  their  squadron  of  150  lances.  (Par.  136. ) 

Our  C.D.R.  (par.  859)  give  ten  miles  as  the  ap- 
proximate front  to  be  covered  by  a  cavalry  brigade 
on  reconnaissance  duty.  This  would  indicate  that  a 
contact  troop  would  cover  much  less  than  ten  miles, 
for  a  brigade  would  send  out  more  than  one  contact 
troop,  in  most  cases. 


—16— 

It  will  not  usually  be  advisable  to  send  wagons 
with  this  contact  troop,  for  the  troop  will  move  rap- 
idly, when  it  does  move,  and  a  wagon  would  be  very 
much  in  the  way.  The  trooper  carries  habitually  on 
the  horse  two  reserve  rations  and  one  feed  of  grain 
for  his  horse.  If  necessary  the  grain  carried  could  be 
increased,  but  as  the  troop  is  well  ahead  of  the  rest 
of  the  regiment  it  will  get  first  chance  at  whatever 
supplies  there  may  be  in  the  country,  and  it  should 
usually  be  able  to  find  some  forage  for  its  horses. 

General  Von  Bernhardi,  however,  recommends 
("Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,"  p.  36)  taking  ration  and 
forage  wagons  with  a  reconnoitering  troop.  He  says 
the  presence  of  these  wagons  will  make  the  troop 
more  independent  in  its  movements,  and  it  will  not 
have  to  worry  about  the  collection  of  subsistence  and 
forage,  and  the  admitted  fact  that  the  wagons  may 
have  to  be  abandoned  if  the  enemy  is  encountered 
should  not  prevent  a  troop  from  starting  out  with 
wagons.  This  may  be  true  when  the  wagons  move 
over  the  good  roads  found  in  Europe,  but  wagons 
would  be  a  nuisance  to  a  reconnoitering  troop  on  the 
roads  usually  found  in  this  country,  and  would  ham- 
per its  movements. 

Of  course  a  regiment  on  reconnaissance  duty 
would  not  always  adopt  the  same  methods.  The  use 
of  contact  troops  would  not  prevent  the  regimental 
commander  from  himself  sending  out  a  patrol  for 
some  special  reconnaissance,  though  if  contact  troops* 
are  used  all  patrols  except  the  strategic  patrols 
would,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  attached  to  some 
contact  troop. 

Reconnoitering  patrols  must  always  be  pushed 
well  to  the  front,  and  the  use  of  contact  troops  fac- 
ilitates the  handling  of  these  patrols  in  most  cases. 
But  as  the  distance  to  the  enemy  diminishes  the  ad- 
vantage of  employing   contact  troops    diminishes. 


—17— 

When  in  close  contact  it  might  be  much  simpler  to 
send  the  patrols  out  direct  from  the  regiment. 

Arrangements  have  now  been  made  to  begin  the 
strategic  reconnaissance,  to  get  information  as  to 
the  enemy's  main  body  of  infantry,  and  for  tactical 
reconnaissance  to  get  information  as  to  his  cavalry 
or  other  troops  that  may  be  near  by. 

Next  come  provisions  for  the  security  of  the 
regiment  on  the  march.  Our  F.S.R.  (par.  49-50) 
state  that  cavalry  marching  independently  adopts 
formations  for  its  advance  guard  similar  to  those 
used  by  infantry,  and  that  a  regiment  at  war  strength 
should  put  a  battalion  or  squadron  in  the  advance 
guard  if  the  enemy  is  liable  to  be  met. 

The  use  of  one  or  more  contact  troops  in  front 
of  the  regiment  would  certainly  tend  to  reduce  the 
size  of  the  advance  guard  needed.  Also  some  de- 
tachments will  usually  be  made  from  the  regiment, 
as  has  been  mentioned,  in  addition  to  sending  out 
the  contact  troops.  Hence  the  use  of  an  entire  war 
strength  squadron  as  advance  guard  for  a  regiment 
from  which  detachments  have  been  made  for  duty 
with  the  infantry  and  the  trains,  and  from  which 
one  or  more  contact  troops  have  been  sent  out,  would 
be  exceptional.  Under  these  conditions  one  or  two 
troops  should  usually  be  sufficient;  detail  for  instance 
as  advance  guard  the  rest  of  the  squadron  from 
which  the  detachments  have  been  made,  leaving  two 
squadrons  in  the  main  body. 

Machine  guns  materially  increase  the  effective- 
ness of  a  cavalry  advance  guard  whenever  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  advance  guard  will  be  used  dismounted 
in  case  the  enemy  is  encountered.  As  to  the  use  of 
the  advance  guard  dismounted  I  will  have  more  to 
say  when  we  come  to  the  cavalry  combat  later.  When 
the  advance  guard  consists  of  a  squadron  or  more  it 
will,  therefore,  often  be  advisable  to  assign  machine 


—18— 

guns  to  the  advance  guard.  The  use  of  machine 
guns  with  a  cavalry  advance  guard  is,  however,  not 
so  usual  with  cavalry  as  with  infantry. 

When  the  advance  guard  consists  of  only  one  or 
two  troops,  to  assign  the  machine  gun  troop  to  the 
advance  guard  would  make  these  troops  very  little 
more  than  an  escort  for  the  machine  guns,  and  would 
hamper  the  advance  guard  in  its  movements.  With 
an  advance  guard  smaller  than  a  squadron  it  will 
therefore  generally  be  better  to  leave  the  machine 
guns  with  the  main  body.  The  position  of  the 
machine  gun  troop  in  the  main  body  is,  of  course,  not 
always  the  same,  but  the  most  usual  place  would  be 
at  the  tail  of  the  regiment. 

As  to  the  distance  of  the  advance  guard  from  the 
regiment,  our  F.S.R.  (par.  50)  state  that  the  dis- 
tances in  a  cavalry  advance  guard  are  generally 
greater  than  in  the  advance  guard  of  an  infantry  or 
mixed  command.  This  is  true  because  the  cavalry  is 
more  mobile,  because  the  cavalry  which  it  expects  to 
meet  gets  over  ground  rapidly,  and  because  cavalry 
needs  earlier  information  of  the  approach  of  an 
enemy.  When  marching  along  the  road  in  column  of 
twos  or  fours  it  can  not  open  fire  as  quickly  as  in- 
fantry and  must  change  its  formation  to  make  an 
effective  charge.  Von  Alten  goes  so  far  as  to  give 
no  distance  in  the  order  to  the  advance  guard  of  a 
regiment  of  cavalry,  but  it  would  seem  better  to 
give  an  approximate  distance  in  the  order,  with  the 
understanding  that  great  latitude  is  allowed,  even 
more  latitude  than  in  an  infantry  command,  for  the 
distance  can  be  changed  readily  and  at  any  time  by 
increasing  or  diminishing  the  gait. 

The  German  F.S.R.  state  that  the  point  of  a 
cavalry  advance  guard  consists  of  a  commander  and 
from  four  to  eight  men;  these  move  forward  by 
successive  advances,  in  the  same  manner  as  a  patrol. 


—19— 

(Par.  190. )  While  nothing  is  prescribed  in  our  regu- 
lations as  to  this,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  this  is 
the  way  the  point  of  a  cavalry  advance  guard  should 
be  conducted.  Instead  of  keeping  up  an  uniform 
gait,  and  an  uniform  distance  from  troops  in  rear  it 
should  usually  move  rapidly  from  one  point  of  ob- 
servation to  another,  the  distance  varying,  and  being 
only  approximately  maintained. 

The  distances  in  a  cavalry  advance  guard  being 
great  and  variable,  the  matter  of  keeping  up  connec- 
tion is  important.  Any  method  that  makes  this  con- 
nection sure  is  good,  but  there  must  be  some  positive 
and  definite  arrangement.  If  connection  is  lost  and 
some  part  of  the  advance  guard  or  the  main  body 
takes  the  wrong  road  serious  trouble  may  result.  It 
is  therefore  the  duty  of  all  commanders  to  prevent 
this  if  possible,  even  though  some  other  officer  is  re- 
sponsible for  keeping  up  connection;  this  is  part  of 
the  ''team  play"  that  is  essential  in  all  military 
operations. 

The  German  F.S.R.  (par.  190)  say:  "Connection 
on  the  march  will  be  maintained,  as  a  fundamental 
principle,  from  rear  to  front.  Any  deviation  from 
the  original  direction  of  the  march  must  be  com- 
municated to  the  rear.  This  makes  it  the  duty  of 
the  commander  in  rear  to  send  forward  connecting 
files  or  patrols  when  necessary,  but  also  makes  it  the 
duty  of  commanders  in  front  to  send  word  to  the 
rear  promptly  whenever  there  is  a  deviation  from 
the  original  direction  of  the  march. 

General  Von  Alten,  in  giving  the  order  for 
putting  a  regiment  on  the  march  in  a  problem 
(Studies  in  Ap.  Tactics,  p.  102)  details  a  noncom- 
missioned officer  and  a  few  men  to  ride  between  the 
advance  guard  and  the  main  body  of  the  regiment 
and  maintain  connection.  This  seems  to  be  an  ex- 
cellent method.     The  noncommissioned  officer  can 


—20— 

use  his  men  according  to  circumstances,  and  can 
notify  the  responsible  officer  when  there  is  danger 
of  taking  the  wrong  road,  or  when  the  distance 
seems  too  great  or  too  small. 

The  commander  of  the  regiment  in  a  case  like 
this  should  generally  march  with  the  advance  guard 
for  a  number  of  reasons.  He  expects  to  get  informa- 
tion from  his  reconnoitering  patrols  and  the  move- 
ment of  the  regiment  will  depend  on  these  messages. 
All  he  can  do  in  most  cases  will  be  to  decide  the 
general  direction  of  the  march  and  the  exact  route 
for  an  hour  or  two  ahead.  After  that  messages 
from  the  reconnoitering  patrols  determine  the  route 
and  the  rapidity  of  the  march.  Under  these  condi- 
tions it  will  be  much  better  for  him  to  be  with  the 
advance  guard,  get  all  messages  promptly,  and  avoid 
having  the  main  body  of  the  regiment  countermarch. 
Also,  if  the  enemy  is  encountered,  the  colonel  with 
the  advance  guard  will  be  able  to  know  the  situation 
and  issue  the  necessary  orders  much  more  promptly, 
which  is  a  big  advantage. 

The  question  of  wagons  with  a  regiment  on  re- 
connaissance has  next  to  be  considered. 

Taking  first  the  combat  train;  there  are  four 
wagons  in  the  combat  train  of  a  regiment,  one  for 
each  squadron  and  one  for  the  machine  gun  troop. 
These  wagons  carry  an  extra  bandolier  of  rifle  am- 
munition and  21  rounds  of  pistol  ammunition  for  each 
man,  and  in  addition  certain  axes,  picks,  shovels  and 
litters. 

For  the  infantry  it  is  prescribed  that  in  the 
absence  of  instructions  the  combat  train  of  each  bat- 
talion will  march  immediately  in  rear  of  the  battalion. 
(I.D.R.  548.)  For  the  cavalry  there  is,  at  present, 
no  such  provision,  and  the  regimental  commander 
must  prescribe  a  place  in  the  column  for  the  combat 
train  if  it  accompanies  the  regiment. 


—21— 

If  the  roads  are  good  the  combat  wagons  may 
follow  in  rear  of  the  regiment  until  such  time  as  it 
becomes  necessary  to  issue  ammunition,  but  it  would 
almost  never  be  a  good  plan  to  have  the  wagon  of 
each  squadron  follow  in  rear  of  the  squadron  as  is 
done  in  the  infantry.  Wagons  with  the  advance 
guard  would  certainly  be  a  hindrance  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  advance  guard  squadron,  and  wagons 
in  the  middle  of  the  main  body,  in  rear  of  the  lead- 
ing squadron,  would  be  an  especial  nuisance,  when- 
ever an  increased  gait  is  taken,  delaying  the  squad- 
ron in  rear.  It  may  therefore  be  taken  as  usual  to 
put  the  combat  train  in  rear  of  the  regiment  when- 
ever it  accompanies  the  regiment  on  the  march. 

Even  with  good  roads  the  combat  train  will  have 
difficulty  in  keeping  up  with  the  regiment,  and  when 
the  roads  are  bad  it  will  be  impracticable  for  them 
to  do  so..  It  will  as  a  consequence  often  be  neces- 
sary to  leave  the  combat  wagons  with  the  field  train. 
If  it  is  thought  that  the  ammunition  in  the  combat 
train  will  be  needed  before  the  field  train  rejoins,  the 
ammunition  may  be  issued  before  starting  out  in  the 
morning.  Of  course  one  can  not  always  foresee  the 
time  when  this  extra  ammunition  will  be  needed, 
but  to  issue  the  ammunition  increases  the  load  on 
the  horses,  and  there  will  be  days  when  the  combat 
train  can  safely  be  left  with  the  field  train  without 
issuing  the  ammunition. 

The  field  train  of  a  cavalry  regiment  consists  of 
22  wagons,  5  carrying  baggage  and  17  carrying  ra- 
tions and  forage.  This  is  ten  wagons  less  than  was 
authorized  by  the  last  previous  F.S.R.,  but  is  still 
quite  a  train,  its  road  space  being  approximately  a 
quarter  of  a  mile.  The  field  train  could  not  keep  up 
with  the  regiment  on  the  road,  so  if  not  left  with  the 
other  trains  of  the  division  it  would  be  somewhere 
between  the  cavalry  regiment  and  the  advance  guard 


—22— 

of  the  division.     This  is  certainly  not  a  desirable  ar- 
rangement and  should  be  avoided  if  practicable. 

If  the  cavalry  regiment  will  probably  be  near 
enough  to  the  division  for  the  field  train  to  join  it 
every  day  or  two  the  field  train  should  stay  with  the 
division  trains,  for  the  cavalry  regiment  should  be 
able  to  get  along  with  what  it  finds  in  the  country 
and  what  the  trooper  carries  on  the  horse.  This 
would,  I  think,  be  the  usual  case. 

If  the  probabilities  are  that  the  regiment  will  be 
detached  so  far  that  the  field  train,  if  left  with  the 
other  trains  of  the  division,  would  not  be  able  to  join 
for  several  days,  it  would  still  be  better  to  leave  the 
field  train  with  the  trains  of  the  division  if  the 
prospects  are  good  for  living  off  the  country.  It 
will  sometimes  happen,  however,  that  the  regiment 
is  detached  for  some  distance  in  country  where  there 
is  little  to  be  found  in  the  way  of  subsistence  or  for- 
age. In  this  case  the  field  train  must  follow  the 
regiment,  though  it  may  be  practicable  instead  to 
send  forward  only  enough  ration  and  forage  wagons 
to  supply  the  actual  needs  of  the  regiment  while  it 
is  detached. 

In  Von  Alten's  study  of  a  regiment  on  this  duty 
of  reconnaissance  he  has  the  field  train  accompany 
the  regiment,  and  Bernhardi,  as  I  have  mentioned, 
even  has  the  contact  troops  take  their  ration  and  for- 
age wagons.  But  I  think  the  excellent  European 
roads  may  account  for  this.  On  our  roads  wagons 
would  be  a  great  handicap  to  reconnoitering  cavalry. 
Pack  mules  have  been  much  used  in  our  service  with 
cavalry  and  will  be  again  if  available. 

A  cavalry  brigade,  under  our  latest  Tables  of  Or- 
ganization, consists  of  two  regiments  of  cavalry. 
The  employment  of  this  brigade  in  reconnaissance 
would  necessarily  be  very  similar  to  that  of  a  regi- 
ment.    Usually  the  brigade  would  be  held  as  much 


—23— 

concentrated  as  practicable,  contact  or  reconnoitering 
troops  or  squadrons  would  be  sent  out  to  coordinate 
the  work  of  the  reconnoitering  patrols,  and  an  ad- 
vance guard  would  provide  for  local  security.  But 
such  a  formation  would  not  always  be  best;  any  for- 
mation that  accomplishes  the  mission  of  getting  infor- 
mation is  correct,  and  there  are  so  many  kinds  of 
terrain  and  such  varied  situations  for  a  cavalry  bri- 
gade on  reconnaissance  that  no  two  situations  would 
require  exactly  the  same  methods. 

If  horse  artillery  is  available,  one  or  more  bat- 
teries would  be  attached  to  a  cavalry  brigade  sent 
out  to  reconnoiter  ahead  of  the  field  army.  This 
artillery  would  ordinarily  march  with  the  main  body, 
for  the  advance  guard  of  a  brigade  would  be  too 
small  to  give  it  sufficient  protection  without  slighting 
its  other  duties  and  becoming  primarily  an  escort  for 
the  artillery. 

As  a  cavalry  brigade  ordinarily  has  horse  artil- 
lery with  it,  the  main  body  must  march  on  roads  on 
which  wagons  can  keep  up.  Also  a  body  as  large  as 
a  brigade  would  move  more  slowly  than  a  regiment. 
Hence  the  combat  wagons  would  usually  be  taken 
along,  going  with  the  artillery  combat  train,  at  the 
tail  of  the  column. 

The  larger  a  body  of  cavalry  the  more  difficult 
it  is  to  find  subsistence  and  forage  in  the  country. 
Also  a  cavalry  brigade  would  probably  operate  at  a 
greater  distance  from  the  infantry,  making  it  more 
difficult  for  the  field  train  to  rejoin  if  left  with  the 
infantry  in  rear.  Supplies  would  be  obtained  in  the 
country  as  much  as  practicable,  but  a  body  larger 
than  a  regiment  could  not  usually  leave  its  field  train 
with  the  infantry  in  rear. 

What  has  been  said  about  the  cavalry  brigade 
applies  as  well  to  the  cavalry  division.  To  keep  a  cav- 
alry division  concentrated,  ready  to  meet  and  defeat 


—24— 

the  enemy's  cavalry,  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  the  whole  division  marches  on  one  road.  A 
proper  system  of  reconnaissance  should  make  it  im- 
possible for  large  bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  to  appear 
suddenly,  with  no  previous  warning.  It  is  a  decided 
advantage  to  make  use  of  all  available  roads,  and  this 
also  facilitates  reconnaissance.  Several  roads  can 
often  be  used,  and  the  division  is  sufficiently  concen- 
trated if  it  is  practicable  to  get  it  together  promptly, 
when  the  larger  bodies  of  the  enemy  are  located  in 
the  vicinity  by  the  reconnoitering  patrols.  When 
the  division  marches  on  one  road  the  artillery  regi- 
ment would  ordinarily  be  with  the  main  body,  though 
a  battery  might  be  assigned  to  the  advance  guard  on 
occasion. 

The  necessity  for  wagons  is  greater  with  a  cav- 
alry division,  on  account  of  the  greater  number  of 
men  and  horses  to  be  supplied  with  rations  and  for- 
age. The  Germans  considered  using  light  autotrucks 
to  replace  the  supply  trains  of  their  cavalry  divisions. 
Whether  this  is  being  tried  in  the  present  war  I  do 
not  know,  but  it  seems  quite  practicable  if  the  roads 
are  good. 

Communication  between  the  independent  cavalry 
brigades  or  divisions  and  field  army  headquarters  will 
ordinarily  be  by  wire  or  radiotelegraph.  A  field  bat- 
talion of  signal  troops  is  assigned  to  the  cavalry  di- 
vision for  this  purpose.  It  has  radio  sections  using 
both  carts  and  pack  mules  and  should  be  able  to  ac- 
company troops  anywhere.  Use  should  also  be  made 
of  commercial  and  railroad  telegraph  lines  wherever 
available. 

The  infantry  division  also  has  in  its  field  battal- 
ion of  signal  troops  a  radio  company  and  this  would 
be  used  to  keep  up  communication  with  the  divi- 
sional cavalry  and  the  cavalry  brigades  of  the  army 
if  close  enough.     The  division  orders  should  provide 


—25— 

for  sending  one  or  more  radio  sections  with  the  caval- 
ry regiment  whenever  it  is  detached  far  enough  to 
make  this  method  of  communication  an  advantage. 

The  commander  of  bodies  of  reconnoitering  cav- 
alry, whatever  their  size,  must  expect  to  act  on  their 
own  initiative  a  great  deal.  Conditions  not  foreseen 
when  they  received  their  orders  will  be  constantly 
arising,  and  it  would  never  do  to  stop  and  ask  for 
orders;  they,  on  the  spot,  are  the  best  able  to  de- 
termine what  should  be  done  in  most  cases.  What 
is  expected  is  that  they  will  act  according  to  their 
best  judgment  and  report  what  they  have  done  as 
soon  as  practicable. 

For  instance,  if  a  cavalry  commander  has  the 
opportunity  to  seize  and  hold  a  position  that  his 
knowledge  of  the  general  situation  enables  him  to  see 
is  important,  he  should  not  hesitate  because  no 
orders  on  the  subject  have  been  received.  The  com- 
mander who  gave  the  orders  may  not  have  foreseen 
this  situation,  and  should  expect  the  cavalry  com- 
mander to  act  on  his  own  initiative. 

This  is  illustrated  by  the  action  of  General  Buford 
just  before  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  General  Buford, 
with  two  brigades  of  cavalry  and  some  artillery,  re- 
connoitering ahead  of  the  army,  arrived  at  Gettys- 
burg just  as  a  Confederate  infantry  brigade  was  ap- 
proaching. Recognizing  the  value  of  seizing  and 
holding  the  position  at  Gettysburg,  General  Buford 
drove  back  the  Confederate  infantry  and  held  the  po- 
sition until  the  Union  infantry  arrived.  He  had  no 
orders  to  do  this  but  has  always  received  great  credit 
for  the  action  taken. 

Similarity,  the  commander  of  cavalry  sent  out  to 
reconnoiter,  may  know  that  he  can  render  valuable 
service  by  delaying  the  advance  of  a  hostile  force  he 
has  discovered.  The  fact  that  he  has  not  received 
specific  orders  to  delay  the  enemy  should  not  prevent 


—26— 

his  doing  so  if  his  knowledge  of  the  general  situation 
makes  him  think  the  delay  is  important.  The  meth- 
ods he  would  adopt  to  cause  the  necessary  delay  will 
be  left  for  the  next  lecture. 

Leaving  the  cavalry  division,  brigade  and  regi- 
ment, I  want  to  say  a  few  words  about  the  use  of  a 
squadron  attached  to  an  infantry  command.  When 
a  squadron  is  so  attached  the  best  use  that  can  be 
made  of  it  is  generally  in  getting  information,  that 
is  in  reconnaissance.  There  are,  of  course,  other 
uses,  but  first  consider  whether  there  is  any  mission 
of  reconnaissance  that  can  be  assigned  to  this  squad- 
ron and  then  whether  any  other  mission  is  of  more 
importance;  usually  it  can  be  of  most  importance  in 
getting  information. 

The  next  question  is  as  to  whether  it  can  best 
accomplish  this  mission  by  operating  under  the  direct 
orders  of  the  detachment  commander  as  independ- 
ent cavalry,  or  by  working  under  the  orders  of  the 
commander  of  some  covering  detachment;  as  part  of 
the  advance  guard  for  instance.  In  regard  to  this, 
each  case  has  to  be  decided  on  its  merits,  but  it  all 
hinges  on  whether  the  work  assigned  the  cavalry 
will  separate  it  from  the  covering  detachment,  or  will 
keep  it  close  enough  to  the  covering  detachment  to 
make  it  an  advantage  to  have  both  under  one  com- 
mander. 

The  relative  strength  of  the  opposing  cavalry  also 
enters  into  this.  If  the  opposing  cavalry  is  stronger, 
our  cavalry  can  accomplish  little  except  when  closely 
backed  up  by  infantry  in  rear,  and  this  cooperation 
is  best  obtained  by  putting  the  cavalry  under  the 
command  of  the  advance  guard  commander  who  is 
to  see  that  it  gets  the  needed  support. 

When  the  cavalry  is  strong  enough  to  overcome 
the  probable  resistance  of  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
will  probably  be  some  distance  away  from  the  ad- 


—27— 

vance  guard  it  is  more  certain  of  having  a  free  hand 
in  reconnaissance  if  kept  under  the  direct  orders  of 
the  detachment  commander  as  independent  cavalry. 

Whether  made  independent  or  attached  to  the 
advance  guard,  the  cavalry  squadron  can  best  accom- 
plish its  mission  of  getting  information  if  left  as 
nearly  intact  as  possible.  Cut  down  to  absolute  min- 
imum the  troopers  detached  for  local  reconnaissance 
and  messenger  duty,  then  give  the  squadron  comman- 
der his  mission,  telling  him  the  results  desired,  but 
leaving  to  him  as  much  latitude  as  possible  in  getting 
these  results.  This  applies  whether  the  orders  to  the 
cavalry  are  given  by  the  detachment  commander  to 
independent  cavalry,  or  by  the  advance  guard  com- 
mander to  the  advance  cavalry. 

When  a  squadron  is  given  a  mission  of  reconnais- 
sance ahead  of  an  infantry  command  its  methods  are 
similar  to  those  outlined  for  a  reconnoitering  or  con- 
tact troop.  The  squadron  commander  would,  him- 
self, send  out  such  reconnoitering  patrols  as  he  con- 
sidered necessary,  giving  each  its  mission,  while  an 
advance  guard  would  furnish  the  security  patrols 
needed,  the  advance  guard  commander  attending  to 
all  the  details  of  local  reconnaissance,  and  security. 


econd     Lecture 


HP  H  E  last  lecture  was  devoted  almost  entirely  to 
*  the  use  of  cavalry  in  reconnaissance,  and  I  think 
this  is  the  most  important  use  of  cavalry.  It  is, 
however,  by  no  means  its  only  use,  and  I  wish  today 
to  touch  upon  some  of  the  other  ways  in  which  it 
may  aid  in  making  a  campaign  successful  or  in 
averting  disaster  in  case  of  defeat. 

One  important  use  of  cavalry  is  as  a  delaying 
force.  On  account  of  its  mobility  it  can  be  sent  out 
ahead  to  meet  an  advancing  enemy,  and  can  often 
cause  the  delay  that  is  needed  to  allow  the  troops  in 
rear  to  make  whatever  dispositions  are  necessary 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  situation. 
This  is  a  good  mission  to  assign  to  cavalry  at  any 
time  when  delay  is  important;  the  orders  to  the  cav- 
alry should  specifically  direct  delay  if  the  importance 
of  delay  is  foreseen.  And,  as  I  mentioned  in  the 
last  lecture,  the  cavalry  commander  should  under- 
take to  delay  the  enemy  without  specific  orders  if 
his  knowledge  of  the  general  situation  makes  him 
think  that  delay  is  important. 

When  cavalry  is  assigned,  or  undertakes,  the 
mission  of  delaying  a  superior  force  of  infantry  it  is 
a  great  advantage  to  have  artillery  with  the  cavalry. 
Artillery  fire  will  first  cause  the  enemy  to  slow  up 
and  deploy,  or  else  make  a  long  detour,  causing  con- 
siderable delay.  Then  long  range  machine  gun  and 
rifle  fire  will  cause  further  delay,  and  before  the 
enemy  gets  too  close  the  cavalry  and  artillery  with- 
draws from  its  first  position,  moves  rapidly  to  a  posi- 

28 


—29— 

tion  already  selected  in  rear,  and  there  repeats  the 
operation,  gaining  more  time. 

The  decision  as  to  when  to  withdraw  requires 
good  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry  com- 
mander. If  he  waits  too  long  the  withdrawal  will  be 
costly,  but  if  he  leaves  his  first  position  too  soon  the 
enemy  will  not  be  much  delayed,  and  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  select  and  occupy  more  positions  in  order  to 
accomplish  the  necessary  delay.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered too  that  after  the  enemy  has  discovered  that 
his  advance  is  not  meeting  with  a  serious  resistance, 
but  is  merely  being  delayed  by  a  force  of  cavalry 
and  artillery,  he  will  not  be  so  easily  stopped  next 
time.  Therefore  the  first  positions  taken  up,  when 
the  enemy  does  not  know  what  he  is  up  against, 
should  be  held  as  long  as  possible,  delay  being  more 
easily  caused  from  these  early  positions. 

Cavalry  brigades  and  divisions  have  horse  artil- 
lery whenever  it  is  available,  and  should  be  able  to 
make  effective  use  of  it  in  delaying  the  advance  of 
an  enemy.  The  cavalry  regiment  of  an  infantry 
division  has  no  artillery,  and  under  many  conditions 
is  not  considered  a  large  enough  force  to  have  artil- 
lery attached.  But  when  this  cavalry  regiment  is 
sent  out  to  delay  the  enemy's  advance  a  battery  or 
battalion  of  the  divisional  artillery  could  well  be  at- 
tached to  assist  in  this  work.  Light  artillery  can 
readily  keep  up  with  cavalry  if  not  required  to  do  so 
for  too  long  a  time,  and  its  use  in  this  way,  with  a 
delaying  force  of  cavalry,  is  justifiable  whenever 
there  is  no  horse  artillery  available. 

When  cavalry,  without  artillery,  acts  as  a  delay- 
ing force  the  main  dependence  is  on  long  range  ma- 
chine gun  and  rifle  fire.  In  selecting  a  position  the 
essential  requirements  are  a  good  field  of  fire  at  long 
range  (that  at  short  range  being  comparatively  un- 
important), cover  for  the  led  horses,  and  a  good  get 


—30— 

away.  The  deployment  should  be  on  a  broad  front, 
as  many  rifles  being  put  in  the  firing  line  from  the 
start  as  practicable.  As  a  determined  resistance  is 
not  contemplated,  there  is  no  necessity  for  strong 
supports  and  reserves,  distribution  in  depth  is  not 
important.  A  heavy  fire  at  long  range  is  opened, 
and  every  effort  made  to  create  the  impression  that 
a  large  force  occupies  the  position.  Here,  as  in 
many  other  situations,  cavalry  needs  as  good  a  rifle 
for  long  range  firing  as  infantry,  and,  personally,  I 
think  it  would  be  a  step  backward  to  give  the  cavalry 
a  carbine  instead  of  a  rifle,  for  a  carbine  is  not  as 
effective  in  long  range  firing. 

Considerable  delay  can  also  be  caused  by  use  of 
the  demolition  outfits  with  which  cavalry  is  equipped. 
No  mention  is  made  of  these  in  the  Tables  of  Organ- 
ization, and  those  in  the  hands  of  troops  have  been 
ordered  turned  in.  But  it  is  intended  that  each 
squadron  of  cavalry  should  have  a  demolition  outfit, 
and  experiments  are  now  being  made  with  a  view  to 
determining  what  should  be  carried  and  the  best 
method  of  carrying  it.  The  former  demolition  out- 
fit included  50  pounds  of  explosive,  and  in  the  solution 
of  problems  it  may  be  assumed  that  each  squadron 
has  a  demolition  outfit,  and  can  carry  out  any  demoli- 
tions that  could  reasonably  be  done  with  50  pounds 
of  explosive. 

We  will  next  take  up  the  question  of  screening. 
Par.  859,  Cav.  D.R.,  couples  screening  and  reconnais- 
sance together,  and  says:  "The  object  of  the  cav- 
alry screen  is  to  gain  information  of  the  enemy,  and 
to  prevent  the  enemy  from  gaining  information  of 
one's  own  army." 

Reconnaissance  and  screening  are,  however,  dis- 
tinct missions.  They  do  merge  into  one  another, 
and  it  is  not  always  possible  to  draw  a  sharp  line  of 
distinction  between  them,  but  in  any  particular  situa- 


—31— 

tion  either  screening  or  reconnaissance  would  be  the 
principal  mission  of  the  cavalry,  and  the  other  would 
be  of  secondary  importance. 

The  F.S.R.  (par.  124)  say  that  the  most  valuable 
use  of  the  cavalry  division  in  the  opening  stages  of  a 
campaign  is  in  driving  back  the  covering  forces  of 
the  enemy  and  gaining  accurate  information  of  his 
dispositions,  strength,  and  movements;  that  is  in  re- 
connaissance. They  say  further:  "The  use  of  the 
cavalry  division  as  a  screen  is  justified  only  in  ex- 
ceptional cases,  as  it  is  seldom  effective  in  absolutely 
preventing  hostile  reconnaissance/ ' 

The  German  F.  S.  R.  (par.  194)  also  treat  of 
screening  as  a  more  or  less  distinct  mission  from  re- 
connaissance and  this  is  a  logical  way  of  considering 
the  duties  of  the  independent  cavalry.  The  measures 
usually  taken  for  reconnaissance  will  not  entirely 
prevent  hostile  observation,  though  they  would 
always  make  the  enemy's  reconnaissance  more  diffi- 
cult. 

Screening,  that  is,  the  prevention  of  hostile  re- 
connaissance, has  always  been  difficult,  and  the  use 
of  aeroplanes  will  make  it  still  more  so.  There  is 
therefore  abundant  justification  for  the  statement  in 
F.S.R.  (par.  124)  that  this  use  of  the  cavalry  division 
should  be  exceptional.  There  may  be  occasions, 
however,  when  the  covering  or  screening  of  the 
movement  of  our  own  troops  will  be  the  most  im- 
portant mission  of  a  body  of  cavalry. 

There  are  numerous  cases  in  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  where  the  movements  of  armies  were 
effectively  screened,  that  is,  the  enemy  remained 
for  some  time  in  ignorance  of  the  movement. 
But  generally  this  was  as  much  due  to  lack  of 
effective  methods  of  reconnaissance  on  the  oppos- 
ing side  as  to  effective  screening.     Also  details  of 


_32— 

the  methods  employed  are  almost  impossible  to  de- 
termine. 

When  the  screening  of  troops  in  rear  is  of 
primary  importance,  and  has  been  made  the  princi- 
pal mission  of  the  independent  cavalry,  there  are 
two  general  methods  of  accomplishing  this  mission. 

What  is  called  the  defensive  screen  is  used  when 
some  natural  obstacle,  such  as  a  river  or  a  mountain 
range  confines  the  enemy's  reconnoitering  parties  to 
a  few  roads.  The  crossings  or  defiles  are  held,  rifle 
and  machine  gun  fire  being  used  in  most  cases,  while 
strong  bodies  of  cavalry  are  stationed  in  favorable 
positions,  prepared  to  repulse  any  attempt  of  the 
enemy  to  break  through.  Rapid  and  reliable  com- 
munication between  the  advanced  posts  and  the 
strong  bodies  in  rear  must  be  arranged.  If  com- 
mercial telegraph  and  telephone  lines  are  available 
they  would  be  used,  as  well  as  the  lines  and  wireless 
apparatus  of  the  signal  corps.  Failing  these  a  well 
organized  messenger  service,  with  relays  when 
necessary,  would  have  to  be  used.  Reconnoitering 
patrols  would  be  pushed  well  forward  toward  the 
enemy.     (Par.  196,  German  F.S.R.) 

When  there  is  no  natural  obstacle  to  assist  in 
stopping  the  enemy's  reconnaissance  and  the  enemy's 
cavalry  is  still  unbeaten,  what  is  called  the  of- 
fensive screen  is  employed.  The  independent  cav- 
alry will  go  out  after  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and 
endeavor  to  drive  it  back  and  defeat  it.  To  ac- 
complish this  the  cavalry  is  kept  as  much  con- 
centrated as  possible,  ready  to  strike  the  hostile  cav- 
alry as  soon  as  its  approach  is  reported  by  the  patrols 
sent  out  from  contact  troops  or  squadrons.  A  suffi- 
ciently strong  force  will  then  remain  in  touch  with 
the  beaten  cavalry  to  prevent  it  from  taking  the 
offensive  again,  while  patrols  sufficiently  strong  to 
attack  and  drive  back  the  enemy's  patrols  are  sent 


—33— 

forward  on  all  roads.  These  patrols  would  be  es- 
pecially charged  to  see  that  hostile  patrols  that  had 
gotten  through  were  not  allowed  to  get  back  with 
information. 

The  offensive  screen  is  based  on  the  theory  that 
if  you  can  decisively  defeat  and  drive  back  the  main 
body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  keep  it  back  his 
patrols  can  be  kept  from  getting  information. 

This  does  not  mean  that  cavalry  inferior  in 
strength  to  the  enemy's  cavalry  could  do  no  screen- 
ing. The  enemy's  small  reconnoitering  parties  can 
still  be  driven  back  wherever  encountered. 

Such  screening  would  not  be  effective  against 
an  aggressive  force  of  cavalry,  for  it  could  break 
through  the  screen,  but  while  we  try  to  arrange  for 
the  enemy's  acting  always  with  good  judgment,  he 
also  often  makes  mistakes  and  may  fail  to  make  use 
of  his  superiority.  In  this  situation  also,  infantry 
may  be  detached  to  operate  with  the  cavalry,  by 
holding  supporting  points  on  which  the  cavalry  may 
may  fall  back  without  disclosing  the  main  forces  of 
the  army. 

Where  the  terrain  is  such  that  the  general  plan 
of  the  defensive  screen  can  be  employed  it  is  very 
effective  and  would  usually  be  employed.  But  it  is 
not  always  a  matter  of  choice— use  the  method  best 
suited  to  conditions  and  that  is  all  there  is  to  it. 

This  matter  of  having  to  screen  emphasizes  the 
importance  of  decisively  defeating  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry as  early  in  the  game  as  practicable,  for  with 
that  done  all  further  work  of  screening  or  recon- 
naissance is  much  simplified. 

The  general  plan  for  screening  is  not  radically 
different  from  the  plan  for  reconnaissance,  and  the 
two  duties  naturally  overlap,  but  many  incidents 
that  come  up  would  be  handled  quite  differently 
when  screening  is  the  mission  of  most  importance. 


—34— 

Whether  the  mission  of  the  cavalry  has  been  re- 
connaissance or  screening  the  two  main  armies, 
divisions,  or  detachments,  as  the  case  may  be,  will 
eventually  get  so  close  together  that  there  is  no  place 
between  for  cavalry. 

The  independent  cavalry  brigades  and  divisions 
of  the  army  remain  in  front  of  the  main  body  as  long 
as  they  can  be  of  use  in  covering  their  own  troops 
and  harassing  the  enemy,  then  they  clear  the  front 
and  take  position  on  a  flank.  The  divisional  cavalry 
now  continues  its  activities  in  getting  information  of 
the  enemy  and  preventing  the  enemy  from  getting 
information,  but  finally  it  also  withdraws  to  a  flank. 
Reconnaissance  between  the  two  armies  is  now  car- 
ried on  by  the  infantry,  but  the  cavalry  is  not  out  of 
the  game  by  any  means. 

At  one  time  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  of  an  army 
was  often  held  in  rear  of  the  center,  as  part  of  the 
general  reserve  during  a  general  engagement.  There 
may  still  be  occasions  when  this  would  be  a  proper 
use  of  cavalry,  but  generally  the  place  for  the  cav- 
alry is  on  a  flank  of  the  line  instead  of  in  rear  of  the 
center.  This  is  recognized  in  the  F.S.R.  of  most 
armies.  The  flank  is  a  vulnerable  part  of  the  line, 
and  the  cavalry  can  be  used  effectively  on  a  flank 
and  still,  on  account  of  its  mobility,  be  available  to 
reenforce  other  parts  of  the  line  if  necessary. 

The  commander  of  the  army,  or  of  the  division 
in  the  case  of  divisional  cavalry,  should  if  practicable 
decide  which  flank  the  cavalry  is  to  take  position  on, 
and  send  the  necessary  orders.  But  often  the  com- 
mander of  the  cavalry  must  make  this  decision  him- 
self, and  should  not  hesitate  to  do  so  in  the  absence 
of  orders.  Sometimes  there  is  no  choice  as  to  flanks, 
the  cavalry  can  readily  get  to  one  flank  and  only 
with  great  difficulty  to  the  other,  but  when  there  is 
a  choice  the  one  where  the    decisive    action    is    ex- 


—35— 

pectedto  take  place  should  be  chosen,  other  things 
being  equal.  That  is,  in  an  offensive  action  the  cav- 
alry should  usually  be  on  the  side  on  which  the  en- 
veloping attack  is  to  be  made;  on  the  defensive  the 
cavalry  should  usually  be  on  the  flank  which  it  is 
thought  the  enemy  will  attempt  to  envelop.  This  is 
the  flank  on  which  the  cavalry  can  best  "aid  and 
support  a  flanking  force  of  infantry,  or  oppose  a 
flanking  movement  on  the  part  of  the  enemy' '  as  the 
Cavalry  D.  Reg.  express  it.  If  reinforcements  for 
the  enemy  were  expected  from  some  direction  the 
the  cavalry  would  naturally  withdraw  to  a  flank  from 
which  it  could  watch  for  and  delay  these  forces.  The 
other  flank  must  also  be  protected,  and  some  of  the 
cavalry  must  withdraw  to  it,  but  it  would  usually  be 
a  mistake  to  divide  the  cavalry  in  half,  sending  half 
to  each  flank.  Keep  it  concentrated  as  much  as 
possible,  detaching  only  what  is  absolutely  necessary. 

The  character  of  the  ground  on  the  two  flanks 
would  of  course  have  some  influence,  but  with  av- 
erage ground  cavalry  can  operate  in  some  way  and 
the  mere  fact  that  the  ground  on  one  flank  was  more 
suited  to  mounted  action  would  not  ordinarily  cause 
the  cavalry  to  select  that  flank  if  the  decisive  action 
were  expected  on  the  other  flank. 

This  use  of  cavalry  on  a  flank  during  an  infantry 
combat  applies  in  general  to  bodies  of  cavalry  of  all 
sizes.  When  the  attack  order  is  issued  the  question 
to  be  decided  with  the  cavalry  is  usually  as  to  which 
flank  it  should  retire  to,  and  the  same  principles 
govern  in  deciding  this  whatever  the  size  of  the  com- 
mand. I  don't  mean  to  say  that  this  is  the  only 
question  to  be  decided  as  to  the  cavalry,  but  it  is  gen- 
erally one  of  the  questions  that  must  be  decided. 

While  commanders  in  the  field  do  sometimes 
neglect  to  send  orders  to  the  cavalry  at  the  beginning 
of  an  engagement,  leaving  the  cavalry  commander 


—36— 

to  use  his  own  judgment,  this  should  not  be  done. 
The  commander  of  the  whole  force  is  the  only  one 
who  knows  what  his  plans  are,  and  how  the  cavalry- 
can  best  aid  in  carrying  out  these  plans,  so  he  should 
issue  the  necessary  orders,  for  the  cavalry  as  well  as 
for  the  rest  of  the  troops. 

It  is  more  than  likely  that  the  enemy's  cavalry 
will  also  withdraw  to  a  flank,  and  here  there  will  be 
another  cavalry  combat  unless  the  enemy's  cavalry 
has  been  so  decisively  defeated  before  that  there  is 
no  more  fight  left  in  it.  In  order  to  prevent  this 
hostile  cavalry  taking  a  hand  in  the  main  fight,  and 
in  order  to  get  it  out  of  the  way  so  that  our  cavalry 
can  exercise  some  influence  on  the  main  fight,  it  is 
necessary  to  attack  and  defeat  it  as  promptly  as  pos- 
sible. Having  defeated  it,  it  must  be  pursued  and 
driven  from  the  field  or  to  the  protection  of  its  own 
infantry;  but  as  promptly  as  possible  after  the  cav- 
alry fight  the  cavalry  must  be  assembled  and  made 
ready  for  any  action  that  offers  a  chance  of  aiding  in 
the  main  fight.  It  will  often  be  necessary  to  take 
"A  Position  in  Readiness"  until  reconnaissance  de- 
termines what  further  action  can  be  taken. 

The  position  taken  must  be  as  secure  as  practi- 
cable from  the  view  and  fire  of  the  enemy,  but  must 
be  one  from  which  immediate  action  can  be  taken 
when  the  time  comes. 

For  the  cavalry  to  take  a  position  in  readiness 
and  there  await  orders  would  be  entirely  wrong. 
The  cavalry  commander  must  try  to  find  some  way 
to  get  in  the  game  and  usually  will  be  able  to.  And 
in  the  meantime  he  prevents  all  hostile  reconnaissance, 
while  his  own  reconnaissance  is  constant. 

Artillery,  at  the  present  time,  goes  into  action 
some  distance  in  rear  of  the  infantry  firing  line, 
often  on  a  flank,  and  the  detail  of  special  supports 
for  artillery  is  avoided  as  much  as  possible.    In  these 


—37— 

covered  positions  it  is  hard  to  locate  and  put  out  of 
action.  An  enterprising  cavalry  commander  after 
driving  in  the  opposing  cavalry,  should  find  oppor- 
tunities to  locate  batteries  near  the  flanks  and  put 
them  out  of  action. 

If  the  cavalry,  with  horse  artillery,  can  drive  in 
the  enemy's  covering  detachments  and  strike  his 
flank  or  rear  the  moral  effect  is  great,  and  may  give 
just  the  additional  impulse  needed  to  decide  the  day. 
The  presence  of  horse  artillery  with  the  cavalry  in 
such  operations  against  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear 
is  so  important  that  the  regulations  of  some  armies 
prescribe  that  the  horse  artillery  will  remain  with 
the  cavalry  divisions  during  a  general  engagement. 

Balck  says:  "Artillery  is  indispensable  to  a 
cavalry  division  when  the  latter  is  charged  with  the 
task  of  operating  against  the  flank  and  rear  of  the 
enemy  and  of  keeping  hostile  reinforcements  away 
from  the  battlefield."  And  the  German  F.A.D.R. 
say:  "The  batteries  assigned  to  the  cavalry  remain 
with  it  in  battle,  as  they  are  indispensable  to  that 
arm  during  and  especially  after  the  battle,  in  ac- 
complishing the  special  tasks  with  which  it  is  charged. 
But  the  cavalry  leader  should  carefully  consider 
whether  the  tactical  situation  does  not  require  that 
the  batteries  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  rest  of 
the  artillery."     (Balck,  Vol.  II,  p.  476.) 

The  battle  of  Winchester,  Sept.,  1864,  and  the 
battle  of  Nashville,  in  December  of  the  same  year, 
give  such  excellent  illustrations  of  the  use  of  cav- 
alry against  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear  in  a  general 
engagement  that  I  will  read  a  short  account  of  what 
happened.  The  cavalry  was  used  in  one  case 
mounted,  in  the  other  dismounted,  and  in  both  bat- 
tles its  use  on  the  flanks  exercised  a  decisive  in- 
fluence on  the  results. 

At  the  battle  of  Winchester,  Sept.  19,  1864,  the 


—38— 

cavalry  divisions  of  Merritt  and  Averell,  under  Tor- 
bert,  operated  on  the  right  flank  of  Sheridan's  army 
and  their  work  is  described  as  follows  by  Sheridan: 

''To  confront  Torbert,  Palton's  brigade  of  in- 
fantry and  some  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  had  been 
left  back  by  Breckenridge,  but  with  Averell  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Valley  Pike  and  Merritt  on  the  East, 
Torbert  began  to  drive  this  opposing  force  toward 
Winchester  the  moment  he  struck  it  near  Stephen- 
son's depot,  keeping  it  on  the  go  till  it  reached  the 
position  held  by  Breckenridge,  where  it  endeavored 
to  make  a  stand. 

"The  ground  which  Breckenridge  was  holding 
was  open,  and  offered  an  opportunity  such  as  seldom 
had  been  presented  during  the  war  for  a  mounted 
attack,  and  Torbert  was  not  slow  to  take  advantage 
of  it.  The  instant  Merritt's  division  could  be  formed 
for  the  charge  it  went  at  Breckenridge's  infantry 
and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  with  such  momentum  as 
to  break  the  Confederate  left,  just  as  Averell  was 
passing  around  it.  Merritt's  brigades,  led  by  Custer, 
Lowell  and  Devieu,  met  from  the  start  with  pro- 
nounced success,  and  with  saber  and  pistol  in  hand 
literally  rode  down  a  battery  of  five  guns  and  took 
about  1,200  prisoners."        *        *        *        * 

"Early  tried  hard  to  stem  the  tide,  but  soon 
Torbert's  cavalry  began  passing  around  his  left  flank, 
and  as  Crook,  Emory  and  Wright  attacked  in  front, 
panic  took  possession  of  the  enemy,  his  troops,  now 
fugitives  and  stragglers,  seeking  escape  into  and 
through  Winchester."  — (Memoirs  Vol.  II,  page  26.) 

At  the  battle  of  Nashville,  Dec.  14-15,  1864, 
Wilson's  cavalry  corps  was  the  right  flank  of  Gen. 
Thomas'  enveloping  attack  and  and  finally  got  in 
rear  of  the  enemy's  left.  The  finale  of  this  is  thus 
described  by  Colonel  Henry  Stone  of  General  Thomas 
Staff,     an     eye    witness:     "Hatch's    division     of 


—33— 

cavalry,  dismounted,  had  also  pushed  its  way  through 
the  woods,  and  had  gained  the  tops  of  two  hills  that 
commanded  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  works.  Here, 
with  incredible  labor,  they  had  dragged;  by  hand, 
two  pieces  of  artillery,  and  just  as  McMillen  began 
his  charge,  these  opened  on  the  hill  where  Bates  was, 
up  the  opposite  slope  of  which  the  infantry  were 
scrambling.  At  the  same  time  Coon's  brigade  of 
Hatch's  (cavalry)  division  with  resounding  cheers 
charged  upon  the  enemy  and  poured  such  volleys  of 
musketry  from  their  repeating  rifles  as  I  had  never 
heard  equalled.  Thus  beset  on  both  sides,  Bates' 
people  broke  out*of  the  works,  and  ran  down  the  hill 
toward  their  right  and  rear  as  fast  as  their  legs 
would  carry  them."  (B  and  L  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol. 
IV,  p.  463.) 

During  a  general  engagement  the  cavalry  is 
usually  on  a  flank,  or  else  operating  against  the 
.  enemy's  flank  and  rear,  and  this  makes  the  keeping 
up  of  communication  with  army  headquarters  im- 
portant. The  cavalry  commander  must  keep  him- 
self informed  as  to  the  tactical  plan  of  the  army 
commander  and  the  progress  of  the  fight,  and  must 
keep  the  army  commander  informed  as  to  what  the 
cavalry  is  doing.  This  is  best  accomplished  by  the  use 
of  "information  officers"  sent  to  army  headquarters 
and  to  nearby  troops.  These  information  officers 
should  make  full  use  of  the  available  telegraph 
facilities,  and  also  of  messenger.  The  use  of  these 
information  officers  will  enable  the  cavalry  com- 
mander to  cooperate  more  effectively  with  the  rest 
of  the  army,  but  having  this  method  of  communica- 
tion should  never  cause  him  to  wait  for  orders  he 
must  assume  the  responsibility  of  taking  any  action 
that  promises  to  aid  the  general  plan. 


—40— 
Pursuit 

From  its  position  on  the  flank  during  a  general 
engagement  the  cavalry  is  best  able  to  take  up  the 
pursuit  in  case  of  victory.  History  furnishes  very 
few  examples  of  effective  pursuits,  but  many  en- 
gagements where  all  who  read  can  see  that  an  ener- 
getic pursuit  would  have  changed  a  retreat  into  a 
panic,  and  would  have  done  as  much  for  the  success 
of  a  campaign  as  several  battles  without  pursuit  after 
victory.  One  reason  why  the  pursuit  that  might  ac- 
complish so  much  is  not  made  is  because  most  of  the 
victorious  army  is  as  much  exhausted  and  demoral- 
ized as  the  defeated  enemy.  But  there  are  nearly 
always  some  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  and  some 
bodies  of  intact  infantry  that  could  begin  the  pursuit 
at  once  and  they  should  by  all  means  do  so. 

The  ideal  pursuit  is  by  infantry  and  artillery 
straight  from  the  rear  while  all  available  cavalry 
and  horse  artillery  move  out  on  a  parallel  road  to 
harass  the  retreating  enemy  in  flank,  get  in  front  of 
him  and  stop  him  if  possible  and  use  every  effort  to 
prevent  his  reorganizing.  If  no  horse  artillery  is 
available  light  artillery  should  be  used  to  accompany 
the  cavalry,  for  artillery  is  almost  indispensable. 

Patrols  must  keep  in  constant  touch  with  the 
enemy,  and  contact  troops  or  squadrons  can  often  be 
profitably  employed  here  as  in  the  reconnaissance 
before  the  battle. 

A  straight  pursuit  from  the  rear  without  making 
use  of  parallel  roads  to  bring  the  enemy  to  a  stand 
is  not  nearly  so  effective.  If  no  infantry  is  available 
to  take  up  the  pursuit  at  once  the  cavalry  must  if 
possible  pursue  both  from  the  rear  and  on  a  flank, 
for  the  pursuing  bodies  in  rear  are  necessary,  but 
can  readily  be  stopped  by  a  rear  guard  if  no  force  is 
moving  on  the  flank. 


—41— 

The  cavalry  commander  does  not  wait  for  orders 
to  pursue,  for  time  is  too  valuable.  He  organizes  a 
pursuit  at  once  and  then  reports  what  he  has  done 
and  should  be  given  further  orders.  For  this  reason 
it  is  an  advantage  to  leave  the  horse  artillery  with 
the  cavalry  division  during  a  general  engagement 
unless  it  is  urgently  needed  elsewhere,  for  cavalry 
without  artillery  is  not  nearly  so  effective  in  pursuit. 
The  crisis  in  the  battle  does  not  come  entirely  with- 
out warning,  and  the  cavalry  commander  should  be 
able  to  have  his  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  ready  to 
take  up  the  pursuit  at  once  when  the  enemy's  re- 
treat begins,  giving  him  no  time  to  reorganize. 

As  to  covering  a  retreat  in  case  of  defeat  the 
German  Regulations  give  the  following: 

'  'Should  the  issue  of  the  battle  prove  unfavor- 
able the  cavalry  must  strain  every  nerve  to  facilitate 
the  retreat  of  the  other  arms.  It  is  just  in  such 
cases  that  they  must  assume  a  relentless  offensive. 
Repeated  attacks  on  the  flanks  of  the  pursuing  troops 
will  produce  the  best  results. 

"Even  temporary  relief  for  the  retreating  in- 
fantry and  a  short  gain  in  time  may  avert  utter  de- 
feat. The  cavalry  which  effects  this,  will,  though  it 
gains  no  victory,  retain  the  honors  of  the  day." 

Bernhardi  says  that  here  all  the  essentials  are 
set  forth  in  compressed  form  and  adds,  "Continual 
efforts  must  be  made  to  confront  the  enemy,  and  to 
attack  him  whenever  possible  with  cold  steel.  De- 
fensive fire  tactics,  however,  will  of  course  be  em- 
ployed whenever  circumstances  demand  such  action. " 

The  Union  pursuit  after  Shiloh  was  stopped  by 
Forrest's  cavalry  taking  the  offensive,  making  a 
mounted  charge,  just  as  Bernhardi  suggests.  Gen- 
eral Sherman,  who  commanded  the  pursuing  column, 
composed  of  cavalry,  infantry  and  field  artillery, 
describes  this  charge  and  its  effect  in  his  report  as 


—42— 

follows:  ' 'The  enemy's  cavalry  came  down  boldly 
at  a  charge,  led  by  General  Forrest  in  person,  break- 
ing through  oar  line  of  skirmishers  when  the  regi- 
ment of  infantry,  without  cause,  broke,  threw  away 
their  muskets  and  fled.  The  ground  was  admirably 
adapted  for  a  defense  of  infantry  against  cavalry, 
being  miry  and  covered  with  fallen  timber. 

"As  the  regiment  of  infantry  broke,  Dickey's 
cavalry  began  to  discharge  their  carbines,  and  fell 
into  disorder.  I  instantly  sent  orders  to  the  rear  for 
the  brigade  to  form  line  of  battle,  which  was  promptly 
executed.  The  broken  infantry  and  cavalry  rallied 
on  this  line,  and  as  the  enemy's  came  to  it,  our  cav- 
alry in  turn  charged  and  drove  them  from  the 
fipld       ******** 

"The  check  sustained  by  us  at  the  fallen  timber 
delayed  our  advance,  so  that  night  came  upon  us  be- 
fore the  wounded  were  provided  for  and  the  dead 
buried,  and  our  troops  being  fagged  out  by  three 
days'  hard  fighting,  exposure  and  privation,  I  ordered 
them  back  to  their  camps,  where  they  now  are."— 
(R.R.  10  p.  639.) 

This  ended  the  only  attempt  to  pursue  after 
Shiloh.  A  single  charge,  over  unfavorable  ground, 
stopped  all  pursuit  and  solved  the  problem  of  cover- 
ing the  retreat,  although  the  charging  cavalry  was 
eventually  stopped  and  driven  from  the  field. 

General  Forrest  proved  conclusively  that  a  bold 
"charge  at  the  right  moment  may  put  a  complete  stop 
to  the  enemy's  pursuit  after  a  defeat;  but  often  dis- 
mounted fire  action  can  more  effectively  cover  a  re- 
treat. 

To  make  use  of  the  nearest  suitable  position, 
cause  as  much  delay  as  practicable  by  fire  from  rifles 
and  horse  artillery  then  mount  and  fall  back  rapidly 
to  another  position  would  in  many  cases  cause  the 
pursuers  enough  delay  to  let  the  infantry  get  well  on 


—43— 

the  road.  General  Wilson,  who  commanded  the  pur- 
suing Union  Cavalry  after  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
gives  the  following  description  of  such  action  by  the 
Confederate  cavalry  covering  Hood's  retreat: 

"'Hetche's  column  had  not  gone  more  than  two 
miles  when  its  advance,  under  Colonel  Spalding,  en- 
countered Chalmer's  cavalry  strongly  posted  across 
the  road  behind  a  fence  rail  barricade.      *      *      *      * 

"The  gallant  Confederates  were  driven  in  turn 
from  every  fresh  position  taken  up  by  them,  and  the 
running  fight  was  kept  up  till  near  midnight. 
Chalmers  had,  however,  done  the  work  cut  out  for 
him  gallantly  and  well.  He  was  overborne  and 
driven  back,  it  is  true,  but  the  delay  which  he  forced 
upon  the  Federal  Cavalry  by  the  stand  he  had  made 
was  sufficient  to  enable  the  Confederate  infantry  to 
sweep  by  the  danger  point  that  night,  to  improvise 
a  rear  guard,  and  to  make  good  their  retreat  the 
next  day." — (Bat.  and  Lead,  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol. 
IV,  p.  469.) 

Cavalry  is  not  only  used  effectively  in  covering  a 
withdrawal  from  action,  before  a  regular  rear  guard 
is  formed,  but  is  also  an  important  part  of  the  rear 
guard  when  one  is  formed.  The  commander  of  the 
retreating  force  organizes  a  rear  guard  as  soon  as 
practicable,  and  this  rear  guard  should  be  strong  in 
cavalry  because  cavalry  is  valuable  in  keeping  the 
rear  guard  commander  informed  as  to  what  the 
enemy  is  doing  and  also  in  delaying  the  pursuit.  On 
account  of  its  mobility  the  cavalry  can  move  rapidly 
from  one  delaying  position  to  another,  and  it  is  also 
best  able  to  protect  the  flanks.  With  a  force  no 
larger  than  a  division  all  the  available  cavalry  should 
usually  be  assigned  to  the  rear  guard.  There  are  ex- 
ceptions to  this,  as  for  instance  when  a  flank  guard 
also  must  be  detailed  and  needs  cavalry,  but  the  use 


—44— 

of  cavalry  independently  with  a  small  command  re- 
treating is  exceptional. 

When  a  field  army  retreats,  all  the  divisional 
cavalry  is  usually  assigned  to  the  rear  guard,  but  not 
necessarily  all  of  the  cavalry  division.  If  the  enemy 
has  a  force  of  cavalry  in  pursuit  this  pursuing  cav- 
alry will  probably  attempt  to  move  by  some  parallel 
road  to  head  off  the  retreat  and  harass  the  flanks  of 
the  retreating  force,  and  the  cavalry  division  of  the 
retreating  force  can  sometimes  be  best  employed  if 
sent  out  independently  against  this  pursuing  cavalry. 

Raids 

So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  determine  raids  by 
cavalry  were  never  thought  of  before  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion.  At  any  rate  that  war  gave  them  a 
prominence  they  never  had  before. 

Raids  are  defined  in  the  Cavalry  Drill  Regula- 
tions as  isolated  independent  cavalry  operations,  con- 
ducted with  secrecy,  by  rapid  marches,  usually 
avoiding  general  engagements.  Their  objects  are 
various,  but  operations  against  the  enemy's  line  of 
communications  and  depots  and  sources  of  supply 
are  most  usual. 

Sometimes  reconnaissance  as  a  mission  for  the 
cavalry  may  be  combined  with  operations  against 
the  enemy's  communications  and  supply  system  in 
rear  of  his  army.  The  order  for  Stuart's  "Chicka- 
hominy  Raid"  illustrates  this.  At  the  time  this 
order  was  issued  General  Lee  had  just  taken  com- 
mand in  the  field  and  was  contemplating  bringing 
Jackson's  army  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  take 
the  offensive.  It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  get- 
ting of  information  was  important,  but  interference 
with  the  enemy's  supply  system  was  considered  of 
sufficient  importance  to  be  assigned  also  as  a  mission 


—45— 

for  the  cavalry.     The  order,  which  was  in  the  form 
of  a  letter,  was  as  follows: 

Headquarters,  Dobbs  Farm, 

June  11,  1862. 
General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart, 

Commanding  Cavalry: 

General:  You  are  desired  to  make  a  scout  move- 
ment to  the  rear  of  the  enemy  now  posted  on  the 
Chickahominy,  with  a  view  of  gaining  intelligence  of 
his  operations,  communications,  etc.,  and  of  driving 
in  his  foraging  parties  and  securing  such  grain,  cat- 
tle, etc.,  for  ourselves  as  you  can  make  arrangements 
to  have  driven  in.  Another  object  is  to  destroy  his 
wagon  trains,  said  to  be  daily  passing  from  the  Pip- 
ing Tree  Road  to  his  camp  on  the  Chickahominy. 
The  utmost  vigilance  will  be  necessary  on  your  part 
to  prevent  any  surprise  to  yourself,  and  the  greatest 
caution  must  be  practiced  in  keeping  well  in  your 
front  and  flanks  reliable  scouts  to  give  you  informa- 
tion. You  will  return  as  soon  as  the  object  of  your 
expedition  is  accomplished;  and  you  must  bear  con- 
stantly in  mind,  while  endeavoring  to  execute  the 
general  purpose  of  your  mission,  not  to  hazard  un- 
necessarily your  command,  or  to  attempt  what  your 
judgment  may  not  approve,  but  be  content  to  ac- 
complish all  the  good  you  can,  without  feeling  it 
necessary  to  obtain  all  that  might  be  desired.  I 
recommend  that  you  take  only  such  men  and  horses 
as  can  stand  the  expedition,  and  that  you  use  every 
means  in  your  power  to  save  and  cherish  those  you 
do  take.  You  must  leave  sufficient  cavalry  here  for 
the  service  of  this  army,  and  remember  that  one  of 
the  chief  objects  of  your  expedition  is  to  gain  intelli- 
gence for  the  guidance  of  future  movements. 

Information  received  last  evening,  the  points  of 
which  I  sent  you,  leads  me  to  infer  that  there  is  a 


-46— 

stronger  force  on  the  enemy's  right  than  was  pre- 
viously reported.  A  large  body  of  infantry,  as  well 
as  cavalry,  was  reported  near  the  Central  Railroad. 

Should  you  find  upon  investigation,  that  the 
enemy  is  moving  to  his  right,  or  is  so  strongly  posted 
as  to  make  your  expedition  inopportune,  you  will, 
after  gaining  all  the  information  you  can,  resume 
your  former  position. 

I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  Lee, 

General. 
(Reb.  Rec.  15,  p.  590.) 

This  letter  is  not  in  the  brief  form  that  we  adopt 
for  field  orders,  but  it  states  clearly  what  is  the  mis- 
sion of  the  cavalry,  and  specifically  authorizes  the 
cavalry  commander  to  exercise  his  own  good  judg- 
ment in  carrying  out  this  mission.  This  we  expect  a 
cavalry  commander  to  do  in  all  such  operations. 

General  Stuart  successfully  accomplished  both 
missions  assigned  him;  he  obtained  the  desired  in- 
formation and  destroyed  and  captured  large  quan- 
tities of  stores,  losing  only  one  man  on  the  expedition. 

As  to  the  advisability  of  sending  cavalry  in  rear 
of  the  enemy's  army  solely  to  operate  against  his 
lines  of  communication  opinions  differ.  The  Germans 
do  not  favor  such  '  raids"  as  is  indicated  by  the  fol- 
lowing extracts  from  the  German  Regulations: 

"Enterprises  of  long  duration  by  large  bodies  of 
cavalry  against  the  enemy's  lines  of  communiction 
separate  them  from  their  principal  duties.  Such  raids 
are  to  be  undertaken  only  when  cavalry  is  redun- 
dant. Sufficient  ammunition  and  supplies  must  be 
arranged  for."    (Par.  527.) 

"Attempts  on  the  more  distant  hostile  communi- 
cations may  produce  valuable  results;  but  they  must 
not  distract  the  cavalry  from  its  true  battle  objec- 


—47— 

tives.  In  the  event  of  an  engagement,  cooperation 
with  a  view  to  victory  must  be  the  watchword  of  ev- 
ery formation,  whether  great  or  small.' '  (Par.  395.) 

There  is  no  doubt  that  this  view  is  sustained  by 
a  number  of  raids  during  the  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
the  cavalry  being  separated  from  its  principal  duties 
while  engaged  on  several  raids.  It  is  generally  con- 
ceeded  that  Stuart's  cavalry  would  have  been  of  much 
more  value  to  Lee  in  the  Gettysburg  campaign  if  it 
had  stayed  with  the  army  instead  of  going  on  a  raid; 
and  Wilson's  raid,  June,  1864,  accomplished  very  little, 
was  accompanied  by  heavy  losses  and  Wilson  himself 
admits  that  it  ''ended  in  disaster."  (" Under  the  Old 
Flag,"  Vol.  I,  p.  481.) 

Bernhardi  disagrees  with  the  German  Regulations 
saying:  "The  importance  of  such  raids  in  modern  war 
should  not  therefore,  in  my  opinion,  be  underesti- 
mated. They  are  capable  rather  of  exercising  enor- 
mous influence  on  the  course  of  events. "  And  again, 
after  explaining  how  dependent  a  modern  army  is  on 
its  supply,  especially  of  ammunition,  he  says  "I  hold 
therefore  that  such  circumstances  render  a  disturb- 
ance of  the  rear  communications  of  an  army  an 
important  matter." 

"It  will  often  do  the  opponent  more  damage,  and 
contribute  more  to  a  favorable  decision  of  arms  than 
the  intervention  of  a  few  cavalry  divisions  in  the  deci- 
sive battle  itself."  ("Cavalry  in  Future  Wars,"  pp. 
92-97.) 

That  the  results  obtained  may  sometimes  justify 
the  absence  of  the  cavalry  from  the  vicinity  of  the 
army  and  the  risks  involved  is  illustrated  by  several 
successful  raids  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  from 
which  practically  all  our  information  in  regard  to 
successful  raids  comes. 

In  December,  1862,  the  destruction  by  Forrest  of 
the  railroad  north  of  Jackson,  Tenn.,  and  by  Van  Dorn 


—48— 

of  the  depot  of  supplies  at  Holly  Springs,  Miss.,  put 
a  complete  stop  to  Grant's  advance  on  Vicksburg, 
causing  him  to  fall  back  to  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton railroad,  to  get  supplies  from  Memphis.  (R.R.  24, 
p.p.  477,  481,  503,  592.) 

After  the  battle  Murfreesboro  or  Stones  River, 
Dec.  30-31,  1962,  the  long  delay  that  Rosecrans  made 
before  advancing  was  principally  due  to  the  raids 
made  by  Morgan's,  Forrest's,  and  Wheeler's  cavalry 
against  his  communications.  Rosecrans  would  not 
move  until  he  could  organize  a  mounted  force  strong 
enough  to  prevent  these  raids,   (R,  R,  29,  34,  35.) 

In  July  and  August,  1862,  the  operations  of  For- 
rest's and  Morgan's  cavalry  against  Buell's  commun- 
ications, when  Buell  was  advancing  against  Bragg  at 
Chattanooga,  were  so  successful  that  a  commission 
ordered  to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  operation 
of  Buell's  army  found  that  these  raids  prevented  the 
accomplishment  of  Buell's  mission.      (R.  R.  22,  p.  9,) 

In  future  wars  there  will  undoubtedly  be  times 
when  raids  against  the  enemy's  communications  will 
get  great  results,  and  if  the  enemy  knows  that  such 
raids  are  attempted  he  is  bound  to  weaken  his  fight- 
ing force  by  detaching  heavy  guards  to  protect  his 
trains.  The  fact  that  the  Confederate  cavalry  was 
always  looking  for  a  chance  at  the  Union  supply  ser- 
vice accounts  for  the  heavy  guards  usually  detailed 
to  protect  the  Union  trains  in  the  Civil  War.  But 
the  telegraph  and  telephone  facilities  of  the  present 
day,  as  well  as  the  use  of  aeroplanes,  will  make  it 
very  difficult  to  prevent  the  whereabouts  of  a  raiding 
force  from  becoming  known,  and  it  will  be  corres- 
pondingly easy  to  order  out  troops  promptly  to  cut 
off  any  raiding  force  that  is  discovered  and  reported. 
As  a  consequence  a  raiding  force  is  certain  to  run  a 
big  risk  of  being  cut  off  and  destroyed,  or  else  very 
much   demoralized   by  the  forced  marches  it  must 


—49— 

make  to  avoid  destruction.  This,  as  well  as  the  fact 
that  cavalry  is  always  needed  with  the  army  to  get 
information,  must  be  carefully  considered  before  or- 
dering a  raid  against  the  enemy's  communications. 
If  the  probable  damage  to  the  enemy  fully  justifies 
the  risk  taken  and  the  absence  of  the  cavalry,  order 
the  raid,  otherwise  keep  the  cavalry  with  the  army. 

In  operating  in  rear  of  the  enemy  against  his 
communications,  the  main  dependence  for  safety 
must  be  on  secrecy  and  moving  quickly;  hence  the 
raiding  force  must  be  very  mobile,  as  small  as  prac- 
ticable, and  must  take  along  little  or  no  impedimenta. 
But  it  must  be  strong  enough  to  overcome  the  guards 
it  will  certainly  find  protecting  the  enemy's  supply 
service,  otherwise  it  can  accomplish  nothing.  The 
strength  of  raiding  forces  in  the  Civil  War  varied 
from  a  few  hundred  to  more  than  10,000,  which  would 
indicate  that  there  is  no  rule  to  help  us  determine 
the  proper  strength. 

Our  C.D.R.  (par.  856)  mention  the  release  of 
prisoners  as  an  object  for  cavalry  raids,  but  the  com- 
plete failure  of  the  two  great  raids  undertaken  for 
this  purpose  in  the  Civil  War  hardly  encourage  such 
expeditions. 

Kilpatrick  attempted  to  affect  the  release  of  pris- 
oners from  Richmond  in  February  and  March,  1864, 
but  accomplished  nothing,  and  Stoneman,  who  at- 
tempted the  same  thing  at  Macon,  Georgia,  in  July 
and  August  of  the  same  year,  not  only  failed  to  re- 
lease any  prisoners  but  was  himself  captured,  with 
part  of  his  raiding  force. 


Third     Lecture 


'T^HIS  talk  today  will  be  on  the  general  subject  of 
■*■  the  cavalry  combat,  and  I  will  first  take  up  the 
action  of  cavalry  against  cavalry. 

In  discussing  the  employment  of  cavalry  I  have 
endeavored  to  bring  out  the  fact  that  there  will  be 
numerous  cavalry  fights  as  incidents  to  every  cam- 
paign in  which  the  opposing  sides  have  cavalry;  be- 
ginning with  the  meeting  of  the  patrols  of  the  recon- 
noitering  cavalry,  and  not  ending  until  one  or  the 
other  army  has  been  not  only  defeated  but  pursued 
and  if  possible  annihilated.  There  will  of  course  be 
fights  between  cavalry  and  the  other  arms,  but  the 
combat  of  cavalry  against  cavalry  will  always  be  with 
us  unless  the  cavalry  of  one  side  is  so  hopelessly  de- 
feated that  it  gives  up  entirely  all  attempt  to  per- 
form its  functions. 

Cavalry  has  two  methods  of  fighting,  mounted 
when  its  main  dependence  is  on  shock,  supplemented 
by  the  saber  or  pistol,  and  dismounted  when  it  uses 
rifle  fire  very  much  as  infantry.  The  use  of  the  rifle 
mounted  is  so  rare  that  it  need  hardly  be  considered. 

There  are  from  time  to  time  discussions  as  to 
whether  cavalry  should  depend  on  the  mounted  charge 
or  on  dismounted  rifle  fire.  When  these  discussions 
are  analyzed  it  will  generally  be  found  that  the  ques- 
tion in  dispute  is  as  to  which  will  probally  be  used 
most,  the  mounted  charge  or  the  dismounted  firing 
line.  This  question  we  do  not  have  to  decide  in  the 
solution  of  any  problems  here.  The  cavalry  is  trained 
to  fight  mounted  or  dismounted,  and  each  problem 

50 


—51— 

gives  a  concrete  case  in  which  a  decision  has  to  made 
as  to  which  method  of  employment  will  give  the  best 
results  in  that  particular  situation  only. 

I  wish  to  call .  attention  to  a  few  points  in  this 
connection  however.  The  American  cavalry  in  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  made  such  effective  use  of  dis- 
mounted fire  that  the  cavalry  of  all  nations  gradually 
adopted  the  rifle  or  carbine  as  part  of  the  cavalry 
armament  and  all  now  contemplate  the  use  of  dis- 
mounted fire.  But  none  of  the  officers  prominent  as 
cavalry  leaders  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  has  ever 
advocated  doing  away  with  the  saber  and  depending 
on  dismounted  rifle  fire  only.  On  the  contrary  sev- 
eral of  them,  notably  General  Wesley  Merritt,  have 
written  strongly  against  any  such  idea.  And  the 
mounted  charge  was  used  more  toward  the  end  of  the 
war  than  near  the  beginning. 

The  British  in  the  Boer  War  had  the  dismounted 
fire  of  horsemen  used  so  effectively  against  them  that 
the  value  of  rifle  fire  for  cavalry  must  have  been  im- 
pressed on  them.  They  have  mounted  infantry,  to 
supplement  the  work  of  their  cavalry,  but  they  have 
not  done  away  with  the  saber,  and  they  still  count  on 
the  mounted  charge. 

Balck,  who  has  made  a  study  of  cavalry  tactics  as 
well  as  infantry,  states  that  the  German  cavalry  in 
the  Franco-Prussian  War  found  it  necessary  to  arm 
themselves  with  rifles,  and  he  admits  that  cavalry 
may  use  their  carbines  fifty  times  before  they  use 
their  lances  once.  But  he  still  thinks  the  cavalry 
charge  important,  and  doesn't  even  suggest  its  being 
a  thing  of  the  past. 

We  do  not  know  yet  what  changes  will  be  made 
in  the  employment  of  cavalry  as  a  result  of  the  pres- 
ent European  war,  but  we  do  know  that  up  to  the 
time  of  this  war  no  European  nation  thought  the  cav- 
alry charge  a  thing  of  the  past.     The  French  Cav- 


—52— 

airy  Drill  Regulations,  re-written  shortly  before  this 
war,  contained  this  in  regard  to  the  mounted  charge: 

"The  mounted  charge  is  the  principal  method  of 
fighting  employed  by  cavalry.  *  *  *  * 
The  combination  of  fire  action  and  the  mounted 
charge  are  characteristic  of  cavalry  action.  *  * 
The  real  cavalry  spirit  does  not  consist  in  waiting  for 
a  suitable  opportunity  for  a  mounted  charge;  it  car- 
ries with  it  a  spirit  of  enterprise  and  participation 
by  any  or  all  means  of  fighting,  either  on  foot  or 
mounted,  or  by  a  combination  of  both,  in  assisting  the 
other  arms  in  their  endeavor  to  defeat  the  enemy/ ' 

The  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations  of  almost  all  Euro- 
pean nations  contain  principles  similar  to  what  I  have 
just  read  from  the  French  Regulations  and  this  has 
been  incorporated  in  our  experimental  "Cavalry  Ser- 
vice Regulations. " 

Therefore,  when  an  officer  takes  it  upon  himself 
to  discard  the  mounted  charge  entirely,  or  even  to 
pay  little  attention  to  it,  on  the  theory  that  it  is  a 
thing  of  the  past,  he  is  going  squarely  against  the 
plainly  expressed  opinion  of  the  War  Departments  of 
all  nations,  including  our  own.  And  he  is  going 
against  the  expressed  opinion  of  the  cavalry  officers 
who  took  part  in  the  combats  on  which  only  he  could 
base  his  own  opinions.  Whatever  may  be  the  opinion 
of  an  officer  as  to  the  number  of  opportunities  that 
will  probably  occur  in  war  for  the  mounted  charge  he 
must,  in  the  handling  of  cavalry,  make  full  use  of  the 
opportunities  that  do  occur.  To  fail  to  do  so  because 
he  thought  that  such  opportunities  seldom  occur 
would  be  as  much  a  mistake  as  for  a  mechanic  to  fail 
to  use  a  handy  tool  because  he  thought  he  would  not 
often  find  use  for  this  tool. 

There  is  an  Arab  proverb  that  victory  is  gained, 
not  so  much  by  the  number  killed  as  by  the  number 
frightened.     This  is  quite  applicable  to  the  cavalry 


—53— 

charge.  The  loss  on  both  sides  may  be  slight  as  a  di- 
rect result  of  the  actual  charge,  but  when  you  get 
the  other  side  on  the  run  the  loss  is  all  on  his  side  and 
should  be  great.  The  morale  is  always  with  the  side 
that  shows  a  determination  to  close  with  the  enemy, 
don't  let  your  opponent  get  the  morale  on  you  by 
showing  this  determination  while  you  appear  to  want 
to  keep  away  from  him.  And  there  is  no  more  effec- 
tive way  of  showing  a  desire  to  get  at  him  than  by 
going  at  him  at  a  gallop  with  drawn  sabers. 

A  great  advantage  that  the  mounted  charge  has 
over  dismounted  fire  fight,  when  either  has  a  good 
chance  of  success,  is  that  a  decision  is  gained  very 
much  more  quickly  by  the  mounted  charge,  and  usu- 
ally with  a  much  smaller  loss  for  the  successful  side. 
Time  is  always  an  important  element  in  cavalry  oper- 
ations, for  mobility  is  an  essential  quality  of  cavalry, 
and  it  is  certainly  an  advantage  to  get  the  combat 
settled  as  quickly  as  possible. 

To  accomplish  anything  in  reconnaisance  and  the 
other  important  independent  operations  of  cavalry 
the  troops  must  push  ahead  and  keep  going.  Let  the 
cavalry  once  demonstrate  that  they  can  ride  over  the 
opposing  cavalry  and  they  will  be  much  more  aggres- 
sive in  their  action.  On  the  other  hand,  let  them  once 
get  the  idea  that  they  are  helpless  on  a  horse  and 
must  dismount  every  time  an  enemy  approaches 
and  they  are  bound  to  become  more  timid  in  their 
movements,  and  to  be  outclassed  by  the  cavalry  that 
can  not  only  fight  dismounted  but  also  ride  them  down 
when  an  opportunity  occurs.  The  belief  that  he  can, 
on  occasions,  ride  over  the  enemy's  cavalry  is  as  nec- 
essary for  the  cavalryman  as  the  belief  by  the  infan- 
tryman that  he  can,  when  necessary,  use  his  bayon- 
et effectively  to  drive  out  an  enemy  who  will  not  be 
driven  out  by  fire. 


—54— 

In  any  given  situation,  therefore,  where  it  has 
been  decided  that  an  attack  is  proper,  one  should 
first  see  if  a  mounted  charge  has  a  reasonable  chance 
of  success  and  will  accomplish  the  mission.  If  it 
will,  make  the  charge.  Dismount  to  fight  on  foot  on- 
ly when  it  appears  that  a  mounted  charge  would  not 
succeed  or  would  not  accomplish  the  mission  of  the 
cavalry. 

No  rule  can  be  given  for  determining  when  a 
mounted  charge  has  a  good  chance  of  success.  In 
determining  this  question  in  the  solution  of  problems 
the  probable  morale  of  the  enemy  must  be  considered, 
and  it  cannot  be  assumed  that  his  morale  is  poor  un- 
less there  is  something  to  indicate  it.  But  remember 
that  in  actual  service  this  would  be  known  at  times 
and  mounted  charges  could  be  made  that  would  never 
succeed  against  the  good  troops  that  we  usually  as- 
sume that  the  enemy  has  in  map  problems. 

When  two  cavalry  forces  meet  it  may  appear  at 
first  glance  that  if  one  side  dismounts  and  the  other 
side  charges  the  advantage  would  be  with  the  dis- 
mounted line.  But  when  you  dismount  the  other 
man  is  not  going  to  charge  straight  at  you  and  let  you 
shoot  him  up.  He  can  either  disappear  temporarily 
from  your  front,  and  still  be  ready  to  prevent  your 
further  mounted  work,  or  he  can  dismount  a  few  men 
to  hold  your  firing  line  and  with  the  remainder  attack 
you  in  flank  or  rear.  If  your  mission  is  offensive,  as  it 
usually  is  for  cavalry,  you  want  to  get  rid  of  this  op- 
posing cavalry  and  you  cannot  do  so  without  the  use 
of  mounted  action,  alone  or  combined  with  fire  action. 

Of  course  there  will  be  many  situations  where 
dismounted  fighting  only  can  be  used,  and  many 
others  where  a  combination  of  mounted  and  dis- 
mounted will  get  the  best  results.  The  larger  the 
cavalry  command  the  less  chance  there  is  for  it  to 
use  shock  action  alone,  but  the  more  chance  there  is 


—55— 

for  it  to  employ  a  combination  of  fire  and  shock  action. 

Use  fire  action  or  shock  action  or  a  combination 
of  the  two,  in  the  way  that  will  best  accomplish  your 
mission,  but  never  fail  to  consider  the  mounted 
charge,  for  where  it  can  be  used  nothing  is  so  quick 
and  effective.  And  a  sucessful  mounted  charge  will 
have  a  decided  effect  in  raising  the  morale  and  aggres- 
sive spirit  of  the  troops  engaged. 

While  most  of  you  are  probably  familar  with  the 
organization  of  a  troop  of  cavalry  as  given  in  the 
Tables  of  Organization,  I  wish  to  mention  a  few  facts 
in  regard  to  it. 

The  troop  is  always  formed  in  single  rank,  and 
is  divided  into  four  platoons,  two  being  commanded 
by  lieutenants  and  two  by  sergeants.  The  strength 
of  these  platoons  is  so  near  twenty  men,  with  a  troop 
at  war  strength,  that  it  will  be  accurate  enough  for 
all  purposes  to  consider  a  platoon  as  twenty  men  in 
the  solution  of  problems. 

The  platoon  is  divided  into  two  squads,  the  squad 
consisting  of  two  or  three  sets  of  fours.  Therefore  it 
will  not  be  sufficiently  definite  in  the  solution  of  a 
problem  to  say  that  a  squad  of  cavalry  is  sent  with- 
out stating  how  many  men  are  in  the  squad.  At  any 
time  that  a  detachment  less  than  a  platoon  is  made  it 
is  better  to  say  "a  sergeant  (or  corporal)  and  so  many 
men"  are  sent. 

When  the  troop  dismounts  to  fight  on  foot,  usu- 
ally three  men  of  each  set  of  fours  dismount,  the 
fourth  staying  mounted  and  holding  the  horses  of 
the  other  three.  This  gives  three  fourths  of  the  men 
dismounted  with  rifles.  The  guidon  sergeant  takes 
charge  of  the  led  horses  and  can  conduct  them  to  any 
point  the  captain  may  designate,  usually  to  some  cov- 
er as  near  the  dismounted  troop  as  practicable.  Af- 
ter dismounting  to  fight  on  foot  in  this  manner  the 
led  horses  may  be  readily  moved  at  any  time,  in  any 


—56— 

direction.  When  it  is  stated  that  a  troop  is  dismount- 
ed to  fight  on  foot  this  is  what  is  usually  understood 
unless,  something  to  the  contrary  is  stated. 

If  for  any  reason  it  is  not  necessary  to  have  three 
fourths  of  the  troop  dismount,  or  if  on  a  trail  too  nar- 
row to  lead  the  horses  in  fours  and  they  must  be  led, 
the  odd  numbers  only  in  each  four  maj  be  dismount- 
ed to  fight  on  foot,  the  even  numbers  staying  mount- 
ed, and  holding  the  horses  of  the  odd  numbers. 

When  it  is  desirable  on  the  other  hand  to  get  as 
many  men  as  possible  on  the  firing  line,  practically 
the  whole  troop  may  be  dismounted  to  fight  on  foot. 
The  troop  must  first  be  taken  to  the  place  where  the 
horses  are  to  stay,  for  in  this  case  they  cannot  be 
moved  afterward.  The  horses  are  tied  in  pairs,  the 
head  of  one  horse  to  the  cantle  of  the  saddle  of  the 
other.  When  tied  in  this  way  one  or  two  men  can,  if 
necessary,  look  out  for  the  horses  of  the  whole  troop, 
putting  practically  every  rifle  on  the  firing  line. 

Having  dismounted  and  secured  the  horses  in  this 
way  the  horses  can  not  be  moved,  but  there  is  no  other 
objection  to  this  method.  I  have  seen  it  tried  with 
the  horses  of  a  militia  troop,  hired  for  the  camp,  and 
they  stood  quietly  enough  for  one  man  to  look  out  for 
the  horses  of  a  troop.  Other  methods  of  securing 
the  horses  when  they  will  not  have  to  be  moved  are 
to  link  them  in  a  circle  or  to  have  one  man  dismount 
and  hold  a  number  of  linked  horses.  The  main  point 
I  want  to  bring  out  is  that  practically  all  the  men  may 
be  put  on  the  firing  line  if  the  horses  can  be  left  in 
one  place,  with  no  probability  of  having  to  move 
them. 

It  is  usual  to  speak  of  the  horses  as  '  'mobile' '  if 
only  one  half  to  one  fourth  of  the  men  are  dismounted 
and  the  horses  can  be  moved  if  necessary,  while  it  is 
said  that  the  horses  are  "immobile"  if  one  of  the 
other  methods  is  used. 


—57— 

When  the  troop  is  acting  alone  it  is  usually  nec- 
essary to  leave  a  guard  for  the  led  horses;  when  the 
troop  is  in  squadron  the  squadron  commander  or  some 
higher  commander  provides  for  the  protection  of  the 
led  horses  of  the  squadron  if  they  are  consolidated. 

When  the  troop  charges  mounted  the  attacking 
line  may  be  formed  either  in  close  order,  boot  to 
boot,  or  as  foragers.  The  charge  in  close  order  is 
used  against  formed  bodies  of  cavalry;  the  saber  is 
habitually  used  in  the  charge  in  close  order,  for  the 
pistol  would  be  almost  as  dangerous  to  troop  using  it 
in  this  formation  as  to  the  enemy.  At  one  time,  how- 
ever, the  use  of  the  pistol  was  contemplated  in  the 
charge  in  close  order,  and  pistol  practice  included 
practice  at  targets  placed  in  front  and  fired  at  by 
a  troop  advancing  straight  toward  the  targets  at  a 
gallop.  The  number  of  accidents  in  this  practice 
helped  to  convince  cavalry  officers  that  the  pistol  is 
not  suited  to  the  charge  in  close  order.  The  saber  is 
used  as  a  thrusting  weapon,  not  for  cutting.  In  the 
latest  manual  of  saber  exercise  all  cuts  are  eliminated. 

When  the  troop  is  moving  out  to  make  a  charge 
practically  no  commands  are  necessary.  The  captain 
takes  his  place  in  front  of  the  troop  and  it  follows 
him.  Usually  the  trot  is  taken  first,  then  the  gallop, 
gradually  increasing  the  gait,  keeping  in  line  and 
closed  in  on  the  center,  until  about  50  or  75  yards 
from  the  enemy  when  the  command  '  'Charge' '  is 
given  and  the  horses  go  at  full  speed,  the  men  yell- 
ing. 

The  cavalry  of  all  foreign  nations  charges  formed 
bodies  of  cavalry  in  double  rank.  They  think  this 
double  rank  formation  essential  for  the  charge  and 
therefore  make  double  rank  the  habitual  formation 
for  the  cavalry.  The  experimental  Cavalry  Service 
Regulation  now  being  tested  for  our  cavalry  provide 
for  a  double  rank  formation  with  a  horses  length, 


—58— 

about  three  yards,  between  ranks.  In  the  solution  of 
problems  you  will  not  have  to  decide  whether  single 
or  double  rank  is  better  for  the  charge  against  cav- 
alry, for  there  is  no  provision  for  a  double  rank 
formation  in  the  old  C.D.R.,  which  we  will  use. 

When  the  charge  is  made  as  foragers  the  attack- 
ing line  is  formed  with  intervals  of  three  yards  be- 
tween troopers.  In  approaching  the  enemy  at  a  trot 
and  gallop  the  men  keep  in  a  general  line,  but  at  the 
command  '  'Charge' '  all  attempt  to  keep  in  line  is 
abandoned  and  the  men  charge  in  couples  at  full 
speed. 

The  charge  as  foragers  is  principally  used  against 
artillery  and  wagon  trains,  but  may  also  be  used 
against  a  dismounted  firing  line  as  I  will  explain  more 
fully  when  we  take  up  the  attack  against  infantry. 
In  the  charge  as  foragers  the  pistol  is  habitually  used, 
but  the  saber  may  be  used.  The  pistol  is  not  used  as  a 
long  range  weapon;  instead  the  trooper  comes  as  near 
to  putting  it  against  his  opponent  as  possible,  for  at 
a  distance  the  chance  of  hitting  is  not  great. 

The  pistol  is  also  valuable  for  use  by  patrols 
when  hostile  patrols  are  met  and  attacked.  The  at- 
tack of  one  patrol  against  another  is  apt  to  be  a  good 
deal  like  a  charge  as  foragers,  and  the  pistol  would 
generally  be  more  effective  than  the  saber.  In  the 
pursuit  also  the  pistol  may  often  be  used  to  advantage, 
for  a  bullet  from  a  pistol  may  overtake  a  man  run- 
ning away  when  be  could  not  be  reached  by  a  saber. 

In  the  line  of  file  closers  of  a  troop  are  two  ser- 
geants, called  principal  guides.  The  drill  regulations 
(par.  526)  state  that  these  principal  guides  are  the 
"ground  scouts,' '  and  it  is  their  duty  to  precede  the 
troop  whenever  it  makes  a  mounted  charge,  torecon- 
noiter  the  ground.  No  orders  need  be  given  these 
principal  guides  in  most  cases;  it  is  intended  that 
whenever  the  commands  or  orders  of  the  captain  in- 


—59— 

dicate  a  charge  the  ground  scouts  move  out  at  once 
and  precede  the  troop  from  200  to  500  yards. 

Of  course  this  does  not  in  any  way  prevent  the 
captain  from  sending  out  reconnoitering  patrols 
whenever  he  considers  it  necessary  to  reconnoiter 
any  piece  of  ground.  But  if  a  charge  is  ordered  it 
may  be  assumed  that  these  ground  scouts  immediate- 
ly precede  the  troop,  and  that  they  will  join  the  near- 
est flank  of  the  troop  and  take  part  in  the  charge 
without  any  specific  orders  to  do  so. 

The  necessity  for  reconnoitering  the  ground  im- 
mediately ahead  of  a  body  of  cavalry  that  is  to  charge 
to  see  if  it  is  passable  seems  self-evident,  but  there 
are  numerous  cases  in  history  where  disaster  has  fol- 
lowed failure  to  take  this  precaution.  And  to  show 
that  neglect  of  this  kind  is  still  possible,  and  still  has 
the  same  results,  I  will  read  an  extract  from  the  re- 
port of  General  French  on  the  operations  of  the  Brit- 
ish army  in  Belgium  and  northern  France  in  August 
of  this  year.  The  report  is  given  in  the  K.  C.  Star 
of  Sept.  10th,  in  quotation  marks,  so  is  authentic  I 
assume. 

Wire  Stopped  Cavalry 

''About  7:30  in  the  morning  General  Allenby  re- 
ceived a  message  from  Sir  Charles  Fergusen,  com- 
manding the  Fifth  Division,  saying  he  was  very  hard 
pressed  and  in  urgent  need  of  support.  On  receipt 
of  this  message  General  Allenby  drew  in  his  cavalry 
and  endeavored  to  bring  direct  support  to  the  Fifth 
Division. 

"During  the  course  of  this  operation  General  De 
Lisle  of  the  Second  Cavalry  Brigade  thought  he  saw 
a  good  opportunity  to  paralyze  the  further  advance 
of  the  enemy's  infantry  by  making  a  mounted  attack 
on  his  flank.  He  formed  up  and  advanced  for  this 
purpose,  but  was  held  up  by  wire  about  five  hundred 
yards  from  his  objective  and  the  Ninth  Lancers  and 


—60— 

and  the  Eighteenth  Hussars  suffered  severely  in  the 
retirement  of  the  brigade.' ' 

The  flanks  of  a  cavalry  command  must  of  course 
be  protected,  but  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  make 
this  service  automatic.  Combat  patrols  are  sent  out 
by  any  troop  or  squadron  that  has  an  exposed  flank, 
but  they  must  be  specially  ordered  out  by  someone 
in  each  case.  This  is  necessarily  so,  because  no  two 
cases  are  alike  and  it  would  be  impossible  to  prescribe 
even  the  strength  of  such  patrols  without  knowing 
the  particular  situation. 

The  commander  of  any  body  of  troops,  no  mat- 
ter how  large,  may  provide  for  flank  protection,  and 
on  the  other  hand  no  commander  of  a  component  unit 
of  a  body  of  troops  is  justified  in  leaving  his  flank 
uncovered  because  it  is,  or  he  thinks  it  is,  someone 
else's  business  to  provide  flank  protection. 

When  the  troops  acting  alone  charges  mounted 
it  is  usually  formed  in  two  lines,  an  attacking  line 
and  a  support.  The  support  does  not  usually  follow 
directly  in  rear  of  the  attacking  line,  but  is  echeloned 
in  rear  of 'one  flank,  following  the  attacking  line  at 
about  80  yards  and  charging  in  the  manner  that  will 
best  support  the  attack. 


/\ 


/N 


A  second  line  or  support  following  directly  in  rear 
of  the  first  is  of  little  value.     It  merely  takes  away 


—61— 

men  who  could  be  used  to  more  advantage  in  the  first, 
or  attacking  line.  After  the  first  line  hits  the  enemy 
it  either  drives  him  from  the  field  or  engages  in  a 
melee  forming  an  obstacle  through  which  a  second  line 
in  rear  could  not  charge  effectively. 

The  troop  may  charge  in  one  line,  without  a  sup- 
port, or  in  column  of  platoons,  or  even  in  column  of 
fours.  A  platoon  may  also  be  detached  to  charge  an 
enemy  in  flank,  instead  of  following  as  a  support. 


/\ 


i 


/\ 


The  use  of  a  platoon  detached  to  make  a  flank 
attack  is  considered  sufficiently  important  to  have  a 
special  command  for  this  in  the  Tentative  C.D.R. 
The  captain  merely  commands  "First  Platoon  Flank 
Attack"  and  "the  designated  platoon  at  once  moves 


—62— 

out  and  is  conducted  so  as  to  fall  opportunely  on  the 
enemy's  flank." 

When  a  troop  is  acting  alone  it  is  usually  on  some 
mission  of  reconnaissance,  as  for  instance,  a  contact 
troop.  Time  is  an  important  element,  so  when  its  re- 
connaissance is  stopped  by  hostile  patrols  or  a  hostile 
troop  they  must  be  attacked  and  driven  back  if  possi- 
ble. Whenever  possible  the  mounted  charge  will  be 
used,  for  reasons  already  given.  When  this  is  not 
practicable  dismounted  action  is  used,  and  it  may  be 
advantageous  to  combine  a  dismounted  attack  with  a 
mounted  attack  in  flank.  With  as  small  a  body  as  a 
troop  it  is  usually,  however,  better  to  keep  the  troop 
together,  either  mounted  or  dismounted. 

A  question  that  sometimes  comes  up  in  regard  to 
a  detached  troop  or  squadron  is  as  to  how  close  a 
body  of  charging  hostile  cavalry  can  be  and  still  leave 
enough  time  to  dismount  and  stop  the  charge  by  rifle 
fire. 

If  the  ground  is  such  that  the  extended  gallop 
can  be  kept  up,  half  a  mile  can  easily  be  covered  by 
the  charging  cavalry  in  two  minutes.  A  troop  can 
dismount  and  open  fire  in  two  minutes,  and  may  stop 
the  charge;  but  if  the  distance  is  less  than  one  half 
mile  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  the  fire  would 
be  sufficiently  rapid  and  well  directed  to  stop  the 
charge.  Therefore,  if  the  distance  is  less  than  half 
a  mile,  the  hostile  cavalry  is  moving  at  a  gallop,  and 
the  ground  between  the  two  bodies  of  cavalry  is  en- 
tirely open,  with  no  obstacles  to  delay  the  charge, 
it  would  usually  be  a  mistake  to  attempt  to  dismount. 
Under  these  conditions  the  charge  should  be  met  by 
a  mounted  charge,  or  some  method  other  than  dis- 
mounting taken  to  avoid  it.  Various  conditions  may 
modify  this,  as  for  instance,  broken  or  difficult  ground 
between  the  two  bodies  of  cavalry,  the  charging  cav- 


—63— 

airy  not  moving  at  a  gallop,  or  anything  to  indicate 
that  the  ground  would  not  be  covered  rapidly. 

The  C.D.R.  (par.  672)  gives  as  the  usual  forma- 
tion of  a  squadron  for  the  mounted  charge,  when  act- 
ing alone,  two  lines,  an  attacking  line  and  a  support, 
which  follows  about  80  yards  in  rear  of  one  flank  of 
the  attacking  line  and  charges  to  support  the  attack, 
in  whatever  manner  best  suits  the  situation.  Each 
troop  in  the  attacking  line  is  complete— that  is,  a 
troop  in  the  attacking  does  not  ordinarily  hold  out  a 
platoon. 


Or  three  lines,  the  attacking  line  and  support  be- 
ing formed  as  when  there  were  only  two  lines,  while 
a  reserve  follows  in  rear  of  the  opposite  flank  from 
the  support.  Each  troop  in  the  attacking  line  is  com- 
plete, but  the  reserve  and  the  support  may  be  taken 
from  the  same  troop. 

/\ 


—64— 

Of  these  two  formations,  that  in  two  lines  is 
preferable  in  most  cases,  the  troop  on  the  opposite 
flank  from  the  reserve  looking  out  for  its  own  flank, 
by  the  use  of  combat  patrols  or  by  detaching  a  platoon 
if  necessary.  An  echelon  in  rear  is  not  the  only 
method  of  protecting  the  flank;  combat  patrols  are 
always  used,  and  a  platoon  may  be  in  front  of  a  flank 
instead  of  in  rear. 

/S 


This  attack  in  two  or  three  lines,  each  under  a 
separate  commander,  is  somewhat  similar  to  the  so- 
called  '  'normal  attack' '  for  infantry.  If  the  impres- 
sion is  gained  that  all  mounted  attacks  are  made  by 
cavalry  in  this  formation,  it  is  wrong.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  a  '  'normal  attack' '  for  cavalry  any  more 
than  there  is  for  infantry.  No  two  situations  will 
ever  be  exactly  the  same,  and  each  requires  different 
treatment. 

The  drill  regulations  do,  however,  limit  one  to  this 
deployment,  and  there  are  many  situations  where  it 
would  not  be  the  most  suitable.  A  formation  for  at- 
tack that  would  often  be  used  is  to  detach  one  troop 
to  make  a  charge  from  one  direction,  while  the  other 
three  troops,  under  the  major  attack  from  a  differ- 
ent direction. 


—65- 


71 


/ 
/ 


This  is  sometimes  called  a  ''Wing  Attack"  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  line  attack  of  the  Drill  Regula- 
tions. 

It  corresponds  somewhat  to  the  enveloping  attack 
of  infantry  and  has  many  advantages.  It  is  much 
more  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  meet  an  attack  from 
two  directions.  If  defeated  his  defeat  is  more  apt 
to  be  decisive,  for  his  retreat  is  difficult  and  on  the 
other  hand  if  we  are  defeated  our  natural  lines  of 
retreat  are  divergent  which  makes  pursuit  by  the 
enemy  difficult.  If  one  wing  can  move  to  its  position 
under  cover  and  its  attack  comes  as  a  surprise,  the 
advantage  is  of  course  greater.  And  it  is  better  still 
if  both  can.     It  would  usually  be  a  mistake  to  divide 


—66— 

into  two  wings  of  equal  strength.     Each  wing  pro- 
vides its  own  support,  and  covers  its  own  flank. 

The  squadron  may  also  charge  in  one  line,  led  by 
the  major  in  person,  in  line  of  platoon  columns,  in 
column  of  troops  or  in  column  of  platoons. 


The  squadron  can  also  make  use  of  a  combination 
of  mounted  and  dismounted  action,  and  might  in  fact, 


—67— 

be  forced  to  do  so.  If  the  enemy  is  advancing  rapidly 
and  the  main  body  is  still  stretched  out  on  the  road 
the  advance  guard  can  often  dismount  and  fire  from 
some  position  and  from  a  supporting  point  for  the 
rest  of  the  squadron,  which  would  attack  mounted 
from  one  or  both  flanks  of  this  supporting  point. 


The  squadron  commander  would  ordinarially  be 
with  the  advance  guard,  and  could  reinforce  it  if  nec- 
essary, and  indicate  to  the  advance  guard  commander 
that  this  kind  of  action  is  needed. 

In  the  approach,  after  the  enemy  is  known  to  be 
near,  a  line  of  column  at  deploying  intervals  is  gen- 
erally considered  best,  with  the  flanks  covered  by 
combat  patrols. 


—68- 
LINE  OF  FOURS 


If  it  is  not  intended  to  make  use  of  the  advance 
guard  to  hold  a  supporting  point  by  dismounted  fire, 
any  portion  of  it  not  actually  split  up  into  patrols 
would  now  join  the  main  body,  the  squadron  being 
covered  by  patrols  only,  in  most  cases.  The  advance 
guard  being  usually  small  most  of  it  would  be  needed 
for  patrolling. 

Of  course  advantage  must  be  taken  of  the  ground 
to  make  a  covered  approach,  especially  if  under  fire, 
and  the  formation  best  suited  to  the  ground  would  be 
taken.  It  is  generally  a  mistake  to  advance  too  fast, 
until  after  the  actual  formation  for  attack  has  been 
made.  The  patrols  need  time  for  reconnaissance, 
and  faulty  dispositions  are  apt  to  be  made  if  they  are 
not  given  sufficient  time.  Also  the  horses  are  less 
apt  to  be  in  good  charging  condition  if  the  approach 
is  hurried  unnecessarily. 

In  crossing  ground  swept  by  fire  formations  sim- 
ilar to  those  used  by  infantry  are  used,  troops  moving 
at  a  gallop.  An  irregular  line  of  columns  is  about 
the  best  formation  for  going  from  cover  to  cover. 
If  individual  skirmishers  at  wide  intervals  are  used 
they  should  not  go  in  lines,  but  irregularly.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  dismount  every  time  fire  is  encountered. 


—69— 

If  conditions  are  such  that  neither  mounted  action 
alone  nor  a  combination  of  mounted  action  and  dis- 
mounted action  can  be  used  to  advantage,  the  squad- 
ron attacks  dismounted,  if  its  mission  calls  for  an 
attack.  If  there  is  a  chance  to  make  use  of  the  mo- 
bility by  having  horses  it  should  not  be  neglected. 
For  instance,  the  enveloping  attack  may  gain  time  by 
moving  as  far  as  practicable  mounted.  In  fact  it  is 
a  general  principle  to  get  as  close  as  practicable 
mounted. 

In  a  general  way  the  principles  of  the  infantry 
attack  govern,  but  the  horses  must  be  kept  under 
cover  and  a  guard  provided  for  them. 

Whether  the  horses  should  be  kept  mobile  or  not 
is  a  question  always.  They  will  be  mobile,  three 
fourths  of  the  men  dismounting,  unless  otherwise 
ordered.  If  there  is  such  good  cover  for  them  that 
the  guard  can  protect  them  without  their  having  to 
to  be  moved  it  is  a  great  advantage  to  get  as  many 
men  as  possible  on  the  firing  line.  But  there  is  the 
decided  disadvantage  that  mounting  up  afterwards  is 
much  slower.  The  horses  cannot  follow  the  progress 
of  the  action  at  all,  and  they  are  of  course  harder  to 
protect.  If  they  are  liable  to  come  under  artillery 
fire  it  is  especially  bad  to  have  them  immobile,  for 
the  only  thing  to  do  in  that  case  would  be  to  move. 
These  various  points  have  to  be  considered  and  each 
case  decided  on  its  merits. 

In  an  attack  to  get  possession  of  a  bridge  held  by 
dismounted  hostile  cavalry,  for  instance,  the  horses 
might  safely  be  left  immobile,  taking  every  possible 
rifle  into  the  attack. 

But  where  an  immediate  pursuit  is  important  it  is 
an  advantage  to  have  the  horses  mobile  so  they  can 
be  brought  up  promptly. 

The  Drill  Regulations  prescribe  that  a  regiment, 
or  any  other   body   of  cavalry  composed  of  several 


—70— 

squadrons,  charges,  as  a  rule,  in  three  lines.  The 
attacking  line  consists  of  at  least  half  of  the  entire 
force,  and  it  charges  as  one  line.  The  support  con- 
sists of  from  one  fourth  to  one  third  of  the  whole 
force  and  usually  follows  one  flank  of  the  attacking 
line,  under  a  separate  commander,  and  charges  to 
support  the  attacking  line.  The  reserve  consists  of 
the  remainder  of  the  troops,  under  a  separate  com- 
mander, but  is  only  used  under  the  direct  orders  of 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  whole  force. 

In  this  formation  a  regiment  might  have  six 
troops  in  the  attacking  line,  a  squadron  in  the  sup- 
port, and  two  troop  in  reserve. 


A  A 

275 

450  V 


OK 


—71— 

This  is  a  kind  of  normal  attack,  which  often  can- 
not be  used  to  advantage  with  a  regiment. 

The  "Wing  Attack"  has  the  same  advantages  as 
with  the  squadron,  it  is  if  anything  more  applicable 
to  the  regiment.  With  a  force  the  size  of  a  regiment 
it  would  usually  be  advantageous  to  attack  from  two 
directions;  this  could  readily  be  accomplished  by  hav- 
ing a  major  with  one  squadron  attack  from  one  direc- 
tion, while  the  colonel  with  the  other  two  squadrons, 
forming  the  other  wing,  attacks  from  another  direc- 
tion. 


\x  \ 


The  major  commanding  a  wing  conducts  his 
squadron  very  much  as  a  squadron  acting  alone  is 
conducted.  The  colonel  conducts  the  other  two 
squadrons  in  the  proper  direction,  and  has  a  major 
charge  with  as  many  troops  as  seems  best.     If  the 


—72— 

colonel  can  determine  the  proper  number  for  this  line 
he  gives  the  major  this  number  of  troops  only,  and 
merely  directs  him  to  charge,  the  other  troops  form- 
ing the  reserve,  and  also  support  the  attacking  line 
if  necessary. 

If  the  major  has  to  be  given  his  orders  when  the 
colonel  cannot  determine  positively  the  number  of 
troops  that  should  charge,  nor  whether  the  reserve 
will  be  in  position  to  support  the  attacking  line  or 
not,  the  major  is  simply  given  a  squadron  and  one 
or  more  troops  attached,  and  makes  his  attack  very 
much  as  a  squadron  acting  alone  would,  providing 
his  own  support. 

The  use  of  a  supporting  point,  held  by  the  ad- 
vance guard,  using  fire  action,  while  the  rest  of  the 
regiment  attacks  mounted,  on  one  or  both  flanks  of 
the  supporting  points,  would  be  similar  to  that  de- 
scribed for  a  squadron. 


—73— 

The  machine  guns  would  be  with  this  supporting 
point.  If  this  use  of  the  advance  guard  was  foreseen 
the  machine  guns  would  be  ordered  to  join  the  ad- 
vance guard.  If  this  had  not  been  foreseen  they 
would  be  ordered  up  promptly,  and  as  all  the  men  of 
the  machine  gun  troop  are  mounted  it  could  get  into 
action  very  quickly.  It  may  at  times  be  necessary 
for  the  advance  guard  to  fall  back  to  a  good  support- 
ing point,  but  as  it  usually  has  considerable  distance 
from  the  main  body  this  should  cause  no  trouble. 

Whether  the  advance  guard  and  machine  guns 
hold  a  supporting  point  or  not  it  is  desirable  to  get 
the  machine  guns  into  action  if  possible.  Usually 
they  would  be  kept  together  so  as  to  avoid  having  too 
many  lines  of  fire  to  interfere  with  the  movement  of 
the  mounted  units,  and  a  position  on  a  flank  is  most 
likely  to  give  them  a  chance  to  do  effective  work. 

When  the  charge  is  successful  in  any  case  the 
pursuit  is  taken  up  by  some  of  the  troops,  but  it  is 
necessary  to  get  together  a  formed  body  of  troops 
as  promptly  as  possible,  ready  to  repel  any  fresh  hos- 
tile troops  that  may  appear.  There  is  some  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  the  possibility  of  reforming  promptly 
troops  that  have  charged  and  been  engaged  in  the 
melee.  All  agree  that  they  cannot  be  formed  under 
fire,  so  if  there  is  fire  it  would  not  be  attempted,  but 
if  there  is  no  fire  it  would  always  be  attempted.  The 
better  trained  and  disciplined  the  troops  the  better 
the  chance  of  reforming  promptly. 

The  formation  for  attack  by  bodies  of  cavalry 
larger  than  a  regiment  differs  from  that  of  a  regi- 
ment chiefly  in  the  use  of  the  horse  artillery  that  us- 
ually accompanies  them.  The  "wing  attack* '  would 
generally  be  used,  and  would  be  especially  applicable 
when  advancing  on  more  than  one  road.  If  a  sup- 
porting point  is  held  by  the  advance  guard,  the  at- 
tacking troops  moving  by  one  or  both  flanks  of  this 


—74— 

supporting  point,  the  horse  artillery  would  generally 
be  at  this  supporting  point,  and  usually  the  machine 
guns  of  the  regiments  that  are  expected  to  charge 
would  be  sent  to  this  supporting  point  also. 


/ 
/ 


The  troops  holding  this  supporting  point  would 
keep  up  their  fire  as  long  as  it  could  assist  the  charg- 
ing troops.  If  the  charge  is  successful  they  would 
be  available  to  use  as  part  of  the  reserve,  mounting 
promptly.  If  the  charge  is  repulsed  the  supporting 
point,  still  held  by  dismounted  fire,  covers  the  rally- 
ing of  the  troops. 

In  case  of  repluse  it  is  important  that  troops  do 
not  mask  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and  machine  guns 
in  falling  back,  for  the  main  dependence  is  on  them 
at  this  time. 

It  will  therefore  usually  be  advisable  to  have  some 
of  the  troops  dismount,  in  the  fight  of  a  cavalry  force 
larger  than  a  regiment,  in  addition  to  making  use  of 
the  horse  artillery  and  machine  guns.  The  nature  of 
the  terrain  will  also  often  make  it  necessary  to  use 
dismounted  action  by  part  of  a  large  force,  and  if  the 
enemy  uses  dismounted  action  he  forces  the  dismount- 
ing of  at  .least  some  men  in  most  cases.  General 
Bernhardi  says  that  a  force  larger  than  our  regiment 


—75— 

will  seldom  use  mounted  action  alone,  which  seems 
true. 

As  far  as  practicable,  in  the  use  of  fire  action,  the 
general  plan  for  one  or  more  supporting  points,  or 
pivots,  would  be  made,  whether  the  advance  guard 
held  such  a  position  or  not. 

It  would  seldom  happen  that  a  force  larger  than 
a  regiment,  and  opposed  by  cavalry,  would  find  no 
use  for  mounted  action.  But  if  the  terrain  made 
mounted  action  entirely  out  of  the  question,  and  the 
mission  called  for  an  attack,  the  whole  brigade  or  di- 
vision should  be  dismounted,  and  the  attack  made, 
full  use  being  made  of  the  horse  artillery  and  machine 
guns.  In  general  the  principles  of  the  infantry  at- 
tack would  govern. 

Even  though  there  had  been  ample  warning  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  troops  have  been 
formed  up  so  that  there  is  no  necessity  to  have  the 
advance  guard  hold  a  supporting  point  to  cover  the 
deployment,  the  horse  artillery  would  always  be 
brought  into  action  if  possible.  Often  the  commander 
would  do  very  little  more  than  let  the  artillery 
commander  know  the  general  plan  of  attack  and  di- 
rect him  to  support  it.  If  the  artillery  should  take  a 
position  directly  in  rear  of  the  charging  line  its  fire 
would  be  so  soon  masked  that  it  would  be  of  very  lit- 
tle value  in  supporting  the  attack.  Cavalry  moves 
too  fast  for  such  a  position  to  be  good. 


ih  i|i 


—76— 

The  horse  artillery,  in  a  mounted  cavalry  combat, 
is  usually  kept  together,  for  to  divide  it  would  make 
more  difficult  the  concentration  of  fire  on  the  most 
important  target  in  the  short  time  available,  and 
would  also  cause  the  fire  of  some  of  the  artillery 
to  be  masked  soon  by  the  cavalry.  The  artillery  must 
go  into  action  in  the  open,  without  any  attempt  to 
find  concealed  positions  and  use  indirect  laying;  the 
time  is  too  short  for  this.  The  target  of  the  artillery 
is  the  hostile  cavalry,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an 
artillery  duel,  though  it  may  be  necessary  to  assign 
a  portion  of  the  artillery  to  the  task  of  keeping  down 
the  fire  of  the  hostile  artillery  if  it  is  inflicting  losses 
on  our  cavalry.  After  the  fire  of  the  artillery  is 
masked  by  the  advancing  cavalry,  artillery  fire  can 
then  be  turned  on  the  hostile  artillery,  until  the  pur- 
suit begins. 

Usually  the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  will  be 
separated,  and  this  will  make  necessary  a  special 
guard  or  support  for  the  artillery.  The  machine 
guns  of  all  regiments  that  are  to  attack  mounted 
would  usually  join  the  artillery  support.  The  com- 
mander of  this  artillery  support  is  not  under  the 
orders  of  the  artillery  commander,  but  consults  with 
him.  The  conduct  of  this  artillery  support  would  in 
most  cases  be  the  same  as  that  of  an  infantry  support 
for  artillery.  Mounted  patrols  would  be  used,  but 
the  men  who  are  expected  to  actually  drive  back  any 
attacking  parties  would  usually  be  dismounted,  and 
posted  where  they  could  bring  an  effective  fire  on 
such  parties  without  interfering  with  the  fire  of  the 
artillery.  Usually  they  would  be  somewhat  to  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  artillery  (par.  582,  I.D.R.). 


•I*  >l> 


—77— 

A  mounted  reserve  might  be  held  in  rear  of  a 
long  line  of  artillery  to  go  quickly  where  needed,  but 
its  use  would  be  to  reenforce  by  fire  in  most  cases. 
Should  the  artillery  support  charge,  mounted  or  dis- 
mounted, it  must  be  careful  not  to  mask  the  fire  of 
the  artillery  either  in  charging  or  if  driven  back, 
and  it  should  not  be  led  into  a  pursuit  that  would 
leave  the  artillery  unsupported. 

Of  course  no  special  support  for  the  artillery 
would  be  detailed  unless  actually  needed;  that  gener- 
al principle  applies  to  artillery  at  all  times.  But  it  is 
so  often  necessary  to  detail  supports  for  the  horse  ar- 
tillery with  a  cavalry  division  that  the  French  and 
Russian  regulations  provide  for  the  permanent  detail 
of  such  supports. 


i|.  i|> 


171 


The  question  of  the  position  of  the  cavalry  com- 
mander often  comes  up  in  the  solution  of  problems. 
It  is  so  necessary  for  a  cavalry  commander  to  see  the 
ground  and  if  possible  the  enemy,  that  it  is  an  ac- 
cepted principle  that  he  should  be  well  forward— with 
the  advance  guard  as  long  as  the  march  formation  is 
kept  up;  as  far  forward  as  he  can  be  under  cover  of 
patrols  when  the  march  formation  is  ended.  But  he 
will  often  have  to  make  his  dispositions,  based  on 
the  reports  of  patrols  and  the  map. 


—78— 

To  have  the  subordinate  commanders  with  him 
so  they  can  receive  their  orders  personally  and  see 
the  situation  as  the  commander  sees  it  is  an  advan- 
tage. In  some  cases  it  will  be  possible  to  do  this, 
but  a  cavalry  combat  moves  so  fast  that  it  will  often 
be  impossible.  There  is  no  established  system  of 
communication  by  agents  as  with  the  artillery;  those 
commanders  who  are  close  enough  will  be  given  per- 
sonal verbal  orders;  messages,  preferably  by  staff 
officers  will  be  sent  to  the  others.  A  troop  commander 
and  sometimes  a  squadron  commander  can  give  com- 
mands; all  higher  commanders  give  orders,  not  com- 
mands, and  these  orders  are  usually  verbal.  The 
orders  being  verbal  and  transmitted  by  staff  officers 
must  be  simple,  complicated  instructions  will  almost 
always  miscarry. 

Generally  a  commander  does  not  lead  a  charge 
unless  his  whole  command  is  in.  A  major,  for  in- 
stance would  not  lead  the  charge  of  three  of  his 
troops  if  he  had  held  out  a  support  of  one  troop.  But 
if  his  whole  squadron  charges,  or  if  the  remaining 
troop  forms  part  of  the  reserve  under  the  colonePs 
orders,  the  major  takes  his  place  in  the  line  of  cap- 
tains and  leads  the  charge. 

As  to  the  mounted  charge  against  infantry,  the 
I.D.R.  have  this  to  say  (par.  569):  "A  cavalry 
charge  can  accomplish  little  against  infantry,  even  in 
inferior  numbers,  unless  the  latter  are  surprised,  be- 
come panic  stricken,  run  away,  or  can  not  use  their 
rifles." 

This  is  accepted  as  true,  but  it  makes  the  charge 
against  infantry  rare,  not  impossible.  There  are 
numerous  cases  in  history  where  the  infantry  have 
been  surprised,  became  panic  stricken,  and  was  suc- 
cessfully charged  by  cavalry.  In  a  pursuit  this  is  es- 
pecially likely  to  occur.  If  we  should  go  into  Mexico 
it  seems  quite  possible  that  infantry  that  could  be 


—79— 

charged  by  cavalry  might  be  encountered.  And  in 
any  general  engagement  some  of  the  infantry  does 
become  demoralized  at  times,  and  there  may  be  a 
chance  to  change  this  demoralization  into  a  panic  by 
an  opportune  charge. 

When  the  infantry  can  be  surprised,  oris  already 
demoralized,  practically  any  formation  may  be  used  in 
the  charge,  the  one  that  will  get  there  the  quickest 
being  usually  the  best. 

When,  however,  it  is  decided  to  make  a  charge 
against  infantry  which  will  use  its  rifles,  the  forma- 
tion taken  is  important.  A  wing  attack  from  two 
different  directions,  each  wing  having  a  first  line  of 
foragers,  followed  by  other  lines,  some  of  which  at 
least  will  be  in  close  order,  is  generally  accepted  as 
the  best  formation. 


The  theory  of  this  is  that  the  line  of  foragers  will 
draw  the  fire  of  the  infantry,  and  furnish  a  certain 


—80— 

amount  of  protection  to  the  troops  following  in  rear. 
Whether  such  a  charge  will  succeed  or  not  depends 
to  a  great  extent  on  the  moral  effect  produced,  and 
while  endeavoring  to  produce  the  necessary  moral  ef- 
fect, what  is  considered  the  least  vulnerable  forma- 
tion is  taken. 

A  similar  formation  is  taken  in  charging  artillery 
in  action;  approach  from  the  flanks  being  always 
made  if  possible.  The  distance  between  lines  should 
be  about  three  hundred  yards  in  order  to  prevent  one 
shrapnel  from  striking  two  lines. 

As  the  furnishing  of  special  supports  to  artillery 
is  avoided  as  much  as  possible,  it  is  not  at  all  improb- 
able that  an  enterprising  cavalry  leader  in  a  general 
engagement  will  on  occasions  find  artillery  without 
support.  If  there  is  infantry  support,  part  of  the 
charging  force  would  devote  its  attention  to  the  ar- 
tillery and  part  to  the  support.  Dismounted  rifle  fire 
could  also  often  be  combined  with  the  mounted 
charge  in  such  a  case,  the  dismounted  fire  holding 
the  attention  of  the  support  and  making  the  chance 
of  the  charge  coming  as  a  surprise  better. 

If  the  artillery  can  be  caught  without  support  and 
with  the  pieces  limbered,  or  in  the  act  of  limbering 
or  unlimbering  its  only  defense  is  the  pistol  of  the 
men  and  the  cavalry  should  be  able  to  do  great  execu- 
tion by  a  charge  as  foragers. 

Carrying  off  guns  after  they  are  captured  is, 
however,  very  difficult,  for  all  hostile  troops  in  the 
vicinity  will  try  to  recapture  the  guns  and  prevent 
their  being  carried  off.  Black  says  that  military  his- 
tory shows  more  instances  in  which  cavalry  later  lost 
the  guns  captured  than  those  in  which  it  succeeded 
in  getting  away  with  them.     (Vol.  II,  p.  472.) 

Because  the  charge  against  infantry  or  artillery 
with  infantry  supports  is  difficult,  it  by  no  means  fol- 
lows that  cavalry  cannot  attack  either  when  neces- 


Sary.  It  can  use  fire  action  dismounted,  and  has  the 
advantage  of  great  mobility  on  account  of  its  horses. 
This  mobility  enables  it,  for  instance,  to  get  quickly 
to  the  position  of  a  troublesome  battery  and  then  the 
best  method  of  putting  the  battery  out  of  business 
can  be  determined.  And  fire  can  be  opened  from 
several  directions  at  once  which  is  often  very  demor- 
alizing. 

Reconnoitering  cavalry  will,  after  driving  in  the 
hostile  cavalry,  strike  the  infantry  covering  detach- 
ments of  an  army.  The  accomplishment  of  its  mis- 
sion will  often  call  for  an  attack  on  these  covering 
detachments,  to  drive  them  in  if  possible,  or  else  to 
develop  their  strength  and  positions.  Cavalry  with 
horse  artillery  and  machine  guns,  in  addition  to  the 
rifles  of  the  men,  is  entirely  competent  to  make  such 
attacks  when  necessary.  A  dismounted  attack  would 
be  made,  following  the  general  principles  of  the  in- 
fantry attack,  but  full  use  should  be  made  of  the 
greater  mobility  resulting  from  having  horses.  On 
account  of  this  mobility,  dispersion  is  not  the  unpar- 
donable sin  when  cavalry  attacks  dismounted  that  it 
might  be  under  similar  circumstances  with  infantry. 
A  turning  or  enveloping  movement  can  be  made  by  a 
part  of  the  command,  using  their  horses  to  make  the 
movement,  where  a  similar  movement  by  an  infantry 
force  would  be  entirely  too  risky.  In  fact,  this  abil- 
ity to  move  rapidly  to  a  weak  flank  of  the  enemy  and 
there  attack  mounted  or  dismounted  according  to  con- 
ditions as  found,  goes  a  long  way  toward  compensat- 
ing cavalry  for  the  loss  of  horseholders  in  a  dismoun- 
ted combat. 

The  horses  of  the  cavalry  must  be  guarded  when- 
ever it  fights  dismounted,  but  when  opposed  to  infan- 
try alone  the  guards  can  be  made  quite  small,  for 
small  patrols  are  about  all  that  the  infantry  comman- 
der is  likely  to  send  against  the  led  horses.     This  al- 


—82— 

lows  more  men  to  be  put  on  the  firing  line  than 
would  be  possible  in  a  dismounted  fight  against  cav- 
alry. 

Defensive  Position 

When  it  is  necessary  for  cavalry  to  take  up  a  de- 
fensive position  there  are  two  rather  distinct  situa- 
tions. If  a  stubborn  resistance  is  expected,  as  for 
instance,  to  hold  a  position  until  relieved  by  infantry, 
as  many  men  as  possible  are  dismounted,  the  horses 
often  being  left  immobile,  some  distance  to  the  rear, 
and  with  small  guards.  The  occupation  of  the  posi- 
tion would,  in  such  a  case  be  similar  to  its  occupation 
by  infantry.  Should  withdrawal  become  necessary 
in  this  situation  it  is  of  course  difficult,  but  not  im- 
possible. Detachments  hold  strong  points,  while  the 
others  fall  back  to  the  horses.  These  detachments 
would  usually  be  sacrificed,  hut  there  is  a  very  de- 
cided tendency  on  the  part  of  an  attacking  force  to 
devote  all  its  time  to  these  detachments,  forgetting 
the  importance  of  immediate  pursuit. 

When  the  defense  is  to  be  only  temporary,  as  for 
instance  in  a  delaying  action,  the  horses  are  kept  as 
close  as  practicable,  under  cover,  and  would  general- 
ly be  kept  mobile.  The  deployment  would  be  on  a 
broad  front,  with  small  reserves,  a  heavy  fire  being 
opened  at  long  range. 

None  of  these  formations  and  methods  are  in- 
tended as  ready  made  solutions  for  any  problem,  they 
are  merely  to  give  an  idea  of  ways  in  which  cavalry 
may  be  handled.  The  use  of  cavalry  in  combat  is  so 
entirely  dependent  on  the  terrain  that  no  two  situa- 
tions could  ever  be  met  in  the  same  way. 


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